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CIVIC REPUBLICANISM, PUBLIC CHOICE
THEORY, AND NEIGHBORHOOD
COUNCILS: A NEW MODEL FOR CIVIC
ENGAGEMENT
MATTHEW J. PARLOW*
This Article analyzes the lack of civic engagement in local
government decision-making and the problems that result
from it. Public choice theory offers one explanation: domi-
nant special interest groups capture local governments for
their own private interests. Thus, average citizens are not
only alienated from their local government, but they also
find the barriers to entry into local politics too high for col-
lective action and participation. While at first glance this
account seems accurate, public choice theory's explanation of
local governments has normative limitations because it fails
to recognize these features of the local political process as
problematic-much less to offer any solutions.
Therefore, this Article suggests that we ought to reject this
model of local government in favor of a model based on civic
republicanism, which offers a solution to the problem of civic
disengagement. Civic republicanism envisions local gov-
ernment substructures that provide meaningful opportuni-
ties for stakeholders to deliberate with one another regarding
matters facing their community and thus inform the local
decision-making process. This Article explores whether
neighborhood councils-new substructures of local govern-
ment that aim to involve citizens in policy- and decision-
making processes-can improve civic engagement.
Assistant Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law. J.D.,
Yale Law School; B.A., Loyola Marymount University. I am grateful to Professors
William N. Eskridge, Jr., and Janine Young Kim for their thoughts on this Arti-
cle; to Brooke Mallette for her superb research assistance; and to Chapman Uni-
versity School of Law for its financial support.
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INTRODUCTION
It is a truism in today's intellectual discourse that our de-
mocracy is failing in significant ways. Among other things,
scholars bemoan that the general public is largely uninformed
about politics;' that voter turnout is consistently low in federal,
state, and local elections; 2 and that our democracy lacks civic
virtue because of low public participation 3 in politics and gov-
ernment, whether measured by voter turnout or some other in-
dicator of civic engagement. 4 These three phenomena are
probably interconnected, with the last of these criticisms driv-
ing the other two: if people are not civically engaged, they are
more likely to be uninformed about current political and gov-
ernmental issues and are thus less likely to vote.
There are several possible explanations for the current
lack of civic engagement. Public choice theory offers one:
dominant special interest groups capture local government 5
1. Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Com-
petence Through Heuristic Cues and "Disclosure Plus," 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141,
1143 (2003) ("Voters do not know basic facts about ballot measures, seem confused
about the issues, and appear unduly influenced by superficial advertising."). But
see BENJAMIN I. PAGE & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC: FIFTY YEARS
OF TRENDS IN AMERICANS' POLICY PREFERENCES 1, 386-90 (1992) (disputing
claims that voters are ignorant and uninformed in their policy preferences).
2. See generally THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLICIES OF
INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 66-70 (1989) (discussing low voter turnout
in elections); THOMAS E. PATTERSON, THE VANISHING VOTER: PUBLIC
INVOLVEMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 4 (2002) (noting the decline in voter
turnout for elections).
3. Terms like "civic participation," "public participation," and "civic engage-
ment" can include activities ranging from voting to joining a bowling league or lo-
cal softball team. For purposes of this Article, I use these terms interchangeably
to refer to citizen participation in their government decision-making process, ei-
ther through formal (government-sponsored) or informal (community-driven)
means.
4. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 1-24 (2000) (describing the decline in social networks, so-
cial capital, community, and civic engagement). As Carlos Gonzdlez notes,
"American politics vacillates between long periods of uninformed and apathetic
disengagement, and relatively brief periods of popular ferment and participation."
Carlos E. Gonzilez, Popular Sovereign Generated Versus Government Institution
Generated Constitutional Norms: When Does a Constitutional Amendment Not
Amend the Constitution?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 127, 215 (2002).
5. In this Article, I use the term local governments, cities, and localities in-
terchangeably and broadly to refer to local government entities. While the sub-
stance of this Article is most applicable to cities and, to a lesser degree, counties,
the discussion of civic engagement and neighborhood councils has relevance to
other local governments as well. By "substructure" of local government, I am re-
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decision-making for their own private interests. Thus, average
citizens are not only alienated from their government, but they
also find the barriers to entry into local politics too high for col-
lective action and participation. On a superficial level, public
choice theory's descriptive account of local government appears
accurate. It offers convincing explanations of some of the key
features of local government today-in particular, lack of
transparency in policy-making and the capture of the political
process by interest groups. However, public choice theory fails
to recognize such features as problematic, ignoring the wide-
spread belief that the dearth of citizen participation is trou-
bling in our democratic society, and, more importantly, that
such disengagement may lead to dysfunction and illegitimacy
in local government. Instead, it views lack of engagement as
the consequence of rational choice, not a flaw in a system that
fails to provide opportunities for public participation. Thus,
public choice theory suffers from significant normative limita-
tions.
Accordingly, we ought to reject a public choice theory
model of local government in favor of a model infused with civic
republicanism. Unlike public choice theory, civic republican-
ism views the lack of civic engagement as leading to suspect lo-
cal policies that stem from an insiders' game controlled by
dominant interest groups. Moreover, it explains the public
participation problem as deriving not from rational choice, but
rather from the inaccessibility of local government structuring.
Therefore, civic republicanism envisions local government sub-
structures that provide meaningful opportunities for stake-
holders to deliberate with one another regarding matters facing
their community and correspondingly inform the local decision-
making process. In doing so, we can shift from viewing local
governments as a winner-takes-all political arena to an under-
standing of local governments as a forum for engaging commu-
nity stakeholders in a dialogic process to advance government
policies that further the common good.
The goal of this Article is to explore whether neighborhood
councils-new substructures of local governments that aim to
ferring to smaller institutions or entities created within local government by the
government itself. Such smaller institutions tend to address niche areas of policy
or regulation-such as business improvement districts, enterprise zones, and the
like-though, as I argue later, neighborhood councils would have a broader pur-
pose.
2008]
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involve citizens in policy- and decision-making processes-can
improve civic engagement. By providing a viable avenue for ef-
fecting change in their communities, neighborhood councils can
encourage everyday citizens to engage in their democracy in
greater numbers and for a sustained period of time. This
should be a salutary development in local government process,
not only to those who favor the civic republican model of gov-
ernment, but also to public choice theorists. From either per-
spective, more participation should yield better, more represen-
tative decision-making.
Part I of this Article highlights some of the causes of civic
disengagement as well as the problems that result from it and
explains why local governments provide the most meaningful
opportunity for citizen participation in our governmental sys-
tem. Part II analyzes local governments from competing theo-
retical perspectives-public choice theory and civic republican-
ism-and makes a normative case for a civic republican form of
local government. Part III discusses how and why past at-
tempts at civic engagement on a local level have failed and the
lessons that can be gleaned from those failures in order to bet-
ter structure modern neighborhood councils. Finally, Part IV
considers the advent of neighborhood councils, the potential
pitfalls that may determine their success and longevity, and
the transformation they may bring about in local governments
through increased civic participation.
I. LOCAL GOVERNMENT AS THE ANTIDOTE TO CMC
DISENGAGEMENT
In Downsizing Democracy, Matthew Crenson and Benja-
min Ginsberg observe that we have entered an era of "personal
democracy" where citizens no longer collectively mobilize. 6 In
this new personal democratic regime, citizens interface with
their governments as individuals; they do not inform govern-
ment policies through a deliberative process that enables the
community to form a collective identity and express to decision-
makers the common good for the community. As citizens be-
come more private in their interactions with government, they
participate less in the policy-making process and thus wield
6. MATTHEW A. CRENSON & BENJAMIN GINSBERG, DOWNSIZING DEMOCRACY:
How AMERICA SIDELINED ITS CITIZENS AND PRIVATIZED ITS PUBLIC 1, 14 (2002).
[Vol. 79
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less and less influence in the decisions that affect their day-to-
day lives. 7
In this grim assessment, Crenson and Ginsberg are not
alone. One scholar notes that since the nineteenth century, in-
dividuals have had fewer and fewer opportunities to assert in-
fluence or control in their local government decision-making. 8
Another observes that as society becomes dominated by imper-
sonal institutions, citizens experience increased anxiety about
their ability to have a say in the government decisions that af-
fect their lives. 9 This sentiment may stem from the belief that
"there is . . . only a small probability that any change in bene-
fits one receives can be effected by one's own political activities"
in local government actions. 10 Such forced detachment leads
citizens to develop a sense of alienation from government. 1 1
This phenomenon pervades all levels of government, in-
cluding local government, and is particularly acute in urban
areas. Citizens describe their experience with local govern-
ment as marked by apathy, frustration, and disenfranchise-
7. See id. at 10-11. The cyber-revolution makes it even more likely that citi-
zens will pay less attention to local affairs and further weaken already ineffective
neighborhood monitoring of, and input in, local government decision-making. See
Robert B. Ellickson, Monitoring the Mayor: Will the New Information Technologies
Make Local Officials More Responsible?, 32 URB. LAW. 391, 393 (2000) (arguing
that opportunity costs for involving oneself in local governmental affairs increase
as the internet allows citizens to download movies and music; watch live sporting
events; and bid on collectibles through an online auction).
8. See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV L. REV.
1059, 1068-69 (1980). Frug points out several possible explanations for this phe-
nomenon: growth in the government bureaucracy, lack of citizen participation in
the decision-making process, and inaccessible government officials making deci-
sions without consulting the community.
9. See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA
IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 1, 1-7 (1996).
10. PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 119 (1981). Peterson examines both
neighborhood and individual attempts at influencing local government decision-
making. He notes two key considerations which relate to this feeling of anomie
experienced by local residents. Id. First, policy change would have occurred irre-
spective of any lobbying or involvement by neighborhood organizations or indi-
viduals. Id. Second, change oftentimes does not occur even after vigorous lobby-
ing efforts. Id. These observations lead to the prevalent "[y]ou can't fight City
Hall" mentality. Id. at 119-20.
11. Norman I. Fainstein & Susan S. Fainstein, The Future of Community
Control, 70 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 905, 905 (1976). But see J. Eric Oliver, The Effects
of Metropolitan Economic Segregation on Local Civic Participation, 43 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 186, 205 (1999) (positing that low civic participation corresponds with citizen
satisfaction with their governments rather than stemming from feelings of apathy
or alienation).
2008]
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ment. 12 They feel that there are not enough opportunities for
community input in local government decision-making proc-
esses. 13 Moreover, they lament the fragmentation of commu-
nity and express feelings of anomie as a result of their lack of
connectedness to others and their community. 14 When asked,
citizens express a desire to feel part of an integrated commu-
nity where they can both empathize with others over public
concerns that affect their day-to-day lives and seek to address
collectively such concerns.15 Due to the failure of local gov-
ernments to involve citizens in decision- and policy-making
processes, "the public has become highly skeptical of the ability
of government to ensure public safety, to oversee their general
welfare, and to provide them with a satisfactory quality of
life." 16
Despite the disconnectedness between local governments
and their constituents, local governments hold the greatest po-
tential for increasing civic participation. As one scholar has
noted, "cities are a patchwork.., of neighborhoods, each one of
which contains a somewhat greater denominator of values,
needs, and interests than does the city as a whole." 17
12. Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, Deepening Democracy: Innovations in
Empowered Participatory Governance, 29 POL. & SOC'Y 5, 37 (2001). Such apathy
may result from the governmental structure-perhaps by design-or it may be
that individuals in contemporary society do not have the time or interest for par-
ticipation opportunities. Id. As Paul Peterson explains, most local governments
and their decision- and policy-making processes are structured to discourage
neighborhood group formation and involvement. PETERSON, supra note 10, at
121; see also Eleanor Holmes Norton, Public Assistance, Post-New Deal Bureauc-
racy, and the Law: Learning from Negative Models, 92 YALE L.J. 1287, 1293
(1983) (arguing that government administrative bureaucracies have refused to
cede power or influence to community groups that were adopted-either formally
or informally-into the decision-making process).
13. Michele Frisby & Monica Bowman, What We Have Here Is a Failure to
Communicate, PUB. MGMT., Feb. 1996, at A-1. Moreover, residents believe that
those avenues for participation do not really allow citizens or community organi-
zations to effect change or influence the policy decisions. Id.
14. RICHARD C. HARWOOD ET AL., MEANINGFUL CHAOS: HOW PEOPLE FORM
RELATIONSHIPS WITH PUBLIC CONCERNS 1 (1993).
15. See id. at 2.
16. William H. Hansell, Jr., A Common Vision for the Future: The Role of Lo-
cal Government and Citizens in the Democratic Process, NAT'L CIvIC REV., Fall
1996, at 5, 5.
17. Thomas J. Mikulecky, Neighborhoods: Small, More Responsive Local Gov-
ernment, PUB. MGMT., AUG. 1990, at 9, 9. As Richard Briffault notes, "[a]s a social
and a political concept, the city is a heterogeneous place, combining residence,
work, recreation and cultural life, and mixing people of different racial and ethnic
groups, socioeconomic classes and levels of education and occupational attain-
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Neighborhoods, like families, have a history and an identity
that oftentimes bind community members together. They serve
"as the primary context-beyond the household-for family life
and as a focus of many informal relationships and activities."18
The groups of people who form a neighborhood tend to share
many of the same values, concerns, histories, and traditions
that are often unique to their community because these values
are based on the formative experiences that help define the
neighborhood. This communal bond is deepened by the fact
that community members are repeat players with one another
in the most basic and essential activities in daily life: church,
work, school, business, and community organization. 19 Com-
munity members thus get to know one another and build both
trust and respect based on shared experiences and interactions
that can foster a commitment to the public good. 20 This com-
munal experience can, in turn, increase the likelihood that citi-
zens will participate in their government, enhance its effec-
tiveness, and give more credence to the policies adopted
through their involvement. 2 1 Indeed, if channeled properly,
this process becomes self-fulfilling and self-reinforcing. Local
governments can create a greater sense of community that
spurs more civic engagement. Such participation in the gov-
ernmental process, in turn, can strengthen the bonds of the
ment." Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II-Localism and Legal Theory, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 346, 347 (1990).
18. Robert J. Chaskin & Sunil Garg, The Issue of Governance in Neighbor-
hood-Based Initiatives, 32 URB. AFF. REV. 631, 633 (1997).
19. Small, homogenous communities may have fewer internal conflicts and
thus be able to organize better. Richard Briffault, The Role of Local Control in
School Finance Reform, 24 CONN. L. REV. 773, 795 (1992). On the other hand, in
our increasingly diverse society, such civic engagement enables community mem-
bers-who might not otherwise interact-to understand one another better and
deepen their mutual ties to their neighborhood. Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-
Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New
Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 2001 (2000).
20. Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropoli-
tan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1126-27 (1996) [hereinafter Briffault, Local
Government]. The greater the distance between constituents, the less likely such
communal bonding and unity of purpose can occur. See Richard Briffault, "What
About the 'Ism?" Normative and Formal Concern in Contemporary Federalism, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1314 (1994) [hereinafter Briffault, "What about the 'Ism?]; see
also JEFFREY M. BERRY ET AL., THE REBIRTH OF URBAN DEMOCRACY 10 (1993)
(stating that the neighborhood offers the "possibility of face-to-face interaction,
which lies at the heart of the theory of participatory democracy").
21. Briffault, Local Government, supra note 20, at 1127.
20081
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community.22 Thus, the neighborhood as a "mediating institu-
tion" has the potential to be a meaningful entity "within the
formal framework of democratic polity." 23
Local governments are also more ideally suited for new
models of civic participation because they are smaller in size. 24
While state and federal governments can command more re-
sources and have control over broader policies than local gov-
ernments, they are simply too large and inaccessible for mean-
ingful civic participation. To the degree that federal and state
governments could allow for citizen participation in the policy-
making process, such involvement would constitute an insig-
nificant percentage of the respective government's constitu-
ency. 25  In contrast, smaller forms of government invite a
higher percentage of citizens to deliberate directly over issues
affecting their community because it is easier for people to
meet and share their opinions and to solicit feedback from their
fellow citizens. Moreover, local governments also give commu-
nity members a greater sense that their voices will be heard by
the decision-makers as well as by their fellow citizens. 26
In addition, constituents may be drawn to participate in lo-
cal government because of the nature of the policies and regu-
lations enacted at a local level. The purpose of most city gov-
ernments is to provide goods and services to their residents,
businesses, and other stakeholders. Such goods and services
are usually those that affect people's day-to-day lives, such as
22. Richard Briffault, Voting Rights, Home Rule, and Metropolitan Govern-
ance: The Secession of Staten Island as a Case Study in the Dilemmas of Local
Self-Determination, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 827 (1992).
23. See Chaskin & Garg, supra note 18, at 633-34.
24. Briffault, "What About the 'Ism?" supra note 20, at 348 (noting that more
than 75% of cities are less than 5,000 people). In fact, the town meeting form of
government that marked the beginnings of our nation were heralded by many po-
litical thinkers at the time as being the quintessential form of self-government.
George W. Liebmann, Devolution of Power to Community and Block Associations,
25 URB. LAw. 335, 336 (1993). However, due to the increase in population and the
transformation of municipalities and their boundaries, this model of direct democ-
racy has become almost non-existent. Id. at 336-37.
25. Fainstein & Fainstein, supra note 11, at 905. As Kathryn Abrams points
out, federal governmental entities have been formed and developed by pluralist
values and thus are, perhaps by design, distant and inaccessible to the average
citizen. Kathryn Abrams, Law's Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1591, 1604 (1988).
26. Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban Governance,
82 MINN. L. REV. 503, 505 (1997). Conversely, on the state or federal level, the
average citizen is more likely to think that his or her voice will be ignored or
washed out with the hundreds of thousands or millions of other constituents. See
Briffault, supra note 17, at 395.
[Vol. 79
HeinOnline  -- 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 144 2008
CIVIC REPUBLICANISM
trash collection, libraries, education, street paving, parks, pub-
lic safety, and land use regulation, to name a few.2 7 Therefore,
local governments provide an opportunity for citizens to engage
in the decision- and policy-making process not only in a mean-
ingful way, but also on issues that matter most to them. 28
Costs of participation are similarly lower at a local level
than at a state or federal level. Collective action is never easy,
but the larger and more diffuse the group, the more difficult it
is to mobilize and unite it. The amount of time, money, and
energy necessary to reach, educate, and mobilize citizens is
likely to be lower at the local level. 29 Problems of scale are
minimized locally because of the relationships and networks in
neighborhoods and communities that make the crafting of the
participation process more economically efficient. 30 The acces-
sibility and proximity of local governments and elected officials,
in contrast to federal and state governments, also create
greater efficiencies that encourage collective action. Therefore,
local governments constitute the most viable avenue for engag-
ing the public in the decision- and policy-making processes and
provide the proper context for this Article.
27. Richard Briffault, Local Government and the New York State Constitution,
1 HOFSTRA L. & POLY SYMP. 79, 80 (1996).
28. As Richard Briffault notes, "Local governments have long been celebrated
for their role as incubators of democracy." Briffault, Local Government, supra
note 20, at 1123. In fact, Briffault argues that local decision-making enables lo-
calities to tailor their policies to meet the unique needs and conditions of the
community, policies that are far more difficult to craft at a more centralized level
of government because of the divergent experiences that communities within lar-
ger governmental boundaries have. Id. at 1124.
29. Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, 36 URB. LAW
253, 258 (2004).
30. See William R. Potapchuk, et al., The Transformative Power of Govern-
ance, 88 NAT'L CWIC REV. 217 (1999); see also Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Consti-
tution vs. The Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism from the Attack on "Monar-
chism" to Modern Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 74, 101 (1989) (asserting that since
there are fewer constituents on a local level, they can organize more easily into
groups that make up a larger percentage of the population and thus garner more
attention and influence).
2008]
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II. Two MODELS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT: PUBLIC CHOICE AND
CIVIC REPUBLICANISM
A. Public Choice Theory
Many scholars view local governments from a public choice
perspective.31 This commonly held viewpoint explains well the
lack of public participation on the local level. Public choice
theory applies economic ideas to political structures and proc-
esses. 32 It focuses on the interaction of two parties-interest
groups and policy-makers-seeking beneficial legislative and
governmental decision-making outcomes through the rules of
supply and demand. 33 As consumers of the public policy mar-
ket, interest groups represent the demand side, while policy-
makers represent the supply side. 34 Moreover, public choice
theory assumes that all players in the local decision-making
process-elected officials, bureaucrats, business interests, lob-
byists, neighborhood groups, and others-will act in the politi-
cal marketplace as actors in the private, financial marketplace
do: in their own self-interest. 35
Accordingly, the local political process is dominated by in-
dividuals who organize into special interest groups in order to
31. See, e.g., MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR
COMMUNITY AND STABILITY 5-6 (1997) (detailing the successes of the "favored
quarter," a phrase used to describe that portion of the population that reaps the
greatest benefits from local governments); Cashin, supra note 19. As Robert Ben-
nett notes, "No serious observer of contemporary American politics doubts that
interest-group politics is thriving." Robert W. Bennett, Of Gnarled Pegs and
Round Holes: Sunstein's Civic Republicanism and the American Constitution, 11
CONST. COMMENT. 395, 420 (1994); see also Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions
for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75, 89 (1998) (detailing the capture of local
governments by rent-seeking interest groups); Stephen M. Feldman, The Persis-
tence of Power and the Struggle for Dialogic Standards in Postmodern Constitu-
tional Jurisprudence: Michelman, Habermas, and Civic Republicanism, 81 GEO.
L.J. 2243, 2243 (1993) ("Since the 1950s, most constitutional scholars have pre-
sumed that the American political system is pluralistic, with autonomous indi-
viduals struggling in the legislative arena to maximize the satisfaction of their
preexisting private interests.").
32. See GEORGE A. BOYNE, PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE UK AND THE USA 1 (1998).
33. See MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF
POLITICAL MARKETS 17-18 (1981).
34. See ALAN PEACOCK, PUBLIC CHOICE ANALYSIS IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 13 (1992).
35. See Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in
Local Government Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 930, 978 (1988).
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gain benefits for their members through the local government
decision-making process. 36 These benefits, or "rents," come in
the form of local political commodities, such as laws, legisla-
tion, administrative decisions, government contracts, govern-
ment subsidies, and the like. "Public choice theory suggests
that only by organizing into special interest groups can indi-
viduals influence the political process" and gain such rents. 37
Therefore, individuals with similar goals and interests selec-
tively join interest groups seeking to advance their economic,
political, and social agendas in the local government policy-
making process.
Because interest groups seek to maximize their self-
interest, often they must compete against one another for
scarce local government resources. 38 The success of a special
interest group in public choice theory hinges on its effective-
ness and efficiency. Large interest groups tend to be more ef-
fective, but given their need to administer themselves-
through more complex organizational structures and power al-
locations-this effectiveness often comes at the expense of effi-
ciency. 39 Smaller groups are typically more efficient because of
their size, but may not be able to gather the resources neces-
sary to gain effectiveness in the political process.
40
The "free rider" problem also contributes to the inefficiency
of interest groups. An interest group faces a free rider problem
when it provides a benefit to its members that others may en-
joy, even if they did not share any of the burden in attaining
the benefit. 4 1 When free riding occurs, interest groups lose
36. Gary Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Politi-
cal Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 371 (1983) (stating that "actual political choices
are determined by the efforts of individuals and groups to further their own inter-
est"); see also MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 5 (2nd ed. 1971) (explaining that the purpose of all
interests groups is to further their members' interests).
37. See Dorothy A. Brown, The Invisibility Factor: The Limits of Public Choice
Theory and Public Institutions, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 179, 180 (1996).
38. JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 261 (1974).
39. OLSON, supra note 36, at 46-48.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 48. Olson points to three specific problems facing large interest
groups. First, "the larger the group, the smaller the fraction of the total group
benefit any person acting in the group interest receives." Id. Second, "the smaller
the share of the total benefit going to any individual, . . . the less the likelihood
that ... any single individual will gain enough from getting the collective good to
bear the burden of providing even a small amount of it." Id. Third, the larger the
20081
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membership, monetary contributions, and other resources,
leading to the loss of the desired public policy benefit. 42 There-
fore, interest groups that can best avoid free riding and main-
tain the equilibrium between effectiveness and efficiency will
often receive a disproportionate share of any public policy bene-
fits. 43
Competition among interest groups in the public policy
marketplace often leads to coalition-building and compromise.
Coalitions may greatly increase the bargaining position and in-
fluence of what would otherwise be diffuse and statistically in-
significant smaller interest groups. 44 According to James Q.
Wilson, coalitions are most likely to form when "resources and
autonomy for all prospective members can be significantly
threatened (a crisis) or enhanced (an opportunity). ' 45 Interest
groups negotiate and compromise on an agreement to ensure
that a majority of the interest groups involved in a public policy
issue share in the benefit. 46 In this regard, the preferences of
the different interest groups change so that the groups are able
to come to a shared agenda that provides benefits to many or
all groups and that has the best chance to affect public policy
decisions. According to public choice theorists, this majority of
interest groups can exert significant influence over policymak-
ers, as opposed to the less effective influence of each individual,
smaller interest group.47  Indeed, the compromise process
forces interest groups to abandon the "all-or-nothing" pitfall in
public policy and adapt their goals to coincide with those of
other similarly situated groups, thus gaining some benefit to
number of members in the group, "the higher the hurdle that must be jumped be-
fore any collective good at all can be obtained." Id.
42. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of
Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 286 (1988).
Large interest groups are more susceptible to the free rider problem because the
individual benefit will usually be very small, creating an incentive to rely on oth-
ers to contribute and do the work. OLSON, supra note 36, at 53. Smaller interest
groups can better overcome the free rider problem. Id. Not only is the potential
for individual gain greater, which provides an incentive for the individual to con-
tribute, but interest groups can more easily monitor free riders and perhaps ex-
clude them from the public policy's benefit. Id.
43. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 1113 (1989).
44. See Saul Levmore, Voting Paradoxes and Interest Groups, 28 J. LEGAL
STUD. 259, 261 (1999).
45. WILSON, supra note 38, at 267.
46. See MUELLER, supra note 43, at 63.
47. Id.; see also WILLIAM C. MITCHELL, PUBLIC CHOICE IN AMERICA: AN
INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 195 (1971).
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more interest groups and their members. However, this com-
promise process is only successful when all interest groups in
this majority are engaged in a "mutually beneficial ex-
change." 48 In the absence of coalitions, interest groups attain-
ing the effectiveness and efficiency equilibrium mentioned
above will dominate the public policy process.
Constituting the supply side of the political market, local
elected officials' overarching goal is to get reelected or elected
to a higher office. 49 Local elected officials thus pursue means
that lead to this goal: votes, political contributions, expanded
budgets and/or staff, and other avenues for expanding their po-
litical support and power. 50 Votes are a critical component of
sustaining elected status for such officials. Consequently, local
elected officials will not undertake a course of action without
first carefully deliberating upon whether their constituents
would strongly oppose such action.5 1  However, as David
Mayhew points out, "the average voter has only the haziest
awareness" of what his or her elected policymaker actually
does in office. 52 Interest groups, on the other hand, can mar-
shal resources other than votes-namely, political contribu-
tions and support-that are also essential for elections. 53 And
unlike the average voter, interest groups are keenly aware of
local elected officials' actions and express their satisfaction or
dissatisfaction with them through lobbying, pressure and, ul-
timately, through distribution of the aforementioned political
48. See MITCHELL, supra note 47, at 122. Unless interest groups believe they
can gain from such a compromise, there is no incentive for them to participate and
the market fails.
49. See generally DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL
CONNECTION at 36-38 (1974); see also Eskridge, supra note 42, at 288 (stating
that "[p]ublic choice theory argues that legislative behavior is driven by one cen-
tral goal-the legislator's desire to be reelected").
50. See Clayton P. Gillette, Comment, Interest Groups in the 21st Century City,
32 URB. LAW. 423, 424 (2000). This is not to imply that elected officials are cor-
rupt or accept bribes, though some inevitably do. Rather, elected officials will act
in ways that reward those interests that have garnered-and presumably will
continue to garner-votes and/or political contributions for that official. More-
over, an elected official may act in a manner which seems to advance the public
good-such as a new public improvement project in the community, like a com-
munity center-but the elected official may not derive his or her motivation for
such action out of a disinterested obligation to the public good, but rather from a
desire to appease the voting constituency.
51. See Eskridge, supra note 42, at 288.
52. MAYHEW, supra note 49, at 40.
53. See id. at 39-40.
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resources. In response, local elected officials seek to keep such
interest groups happy and thus create and distribute rents to
those interest groups that support them in their elections. 54
Those interest groups that can provide these valuable com-
modities to elected officials will ultimately be more successful
in the policy-making marketplace-leading to the capture of lo-
cal governments by such interest groups.
Public choice theorists thus view local government as a fo-
rum for the political marketplace to play out. This means that
local government decisions are illegitimate insofar as they con-
stitute policy outputs that stem not from the community's pref-
erences and needs, but rather from the influence of powerful
interest groups that may or may not represent the majority
view in the community. 55 Public choice theory recognizes this
problem of capture, but it offers few realistic or viable solutions
for a more transparent and responsive local government. For
example, some public choice theorists recommend limiting the
autonomy of local government in order to eliminate or mini-
mize the capture problem. 56 A limited government offers fewer
benefits, which should lead to less rent-seeking behavior. Oth-
ers suggest increasing transaction costs for interest groups to
make capture too expensive to sustain. 57 A third solution,
championed by Charles Tiebout, contemplates consumer-voters
"voting with their feet" and leaving a city that fails to meet
their preferences. 58 The possibility of exodus by citizens, in
54. See Becker, supra note 36, at 373-74 (stating that "taxes, subsidies, regu-
lations, and other political instruments are used to raise the welfare of more in-
fluential pressure groups"). Robert Ellickson describes the purposefully crafted
"cumbersomely indirect system for the delivery of favors" to interest groups-a
system designed to hide public largess from voters that marks today's local gov-
ernments. Ellickson, supra note 31, at 89. This cumbersome process for local
governmental outputs also serves as an inhibitor to civic engagement because it is
purposefully confusing to hide the captured system that showers benefits on the
rent-seeking interest groups.
55. See Gillette, supra note 50, at 423-24.
56. See Donald J. Kochan, "Public Use" and the Independent Judiciary: Con-
demnation in an Interest-Group Perspective, 3 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 49, 106-14
(1998).
57. See id.
58. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416, 419 (1956). However, many have challenged the modern day practi-
cality of this theory, noting that mobility is exceedingly more difficult for a grow-
ing percentage of American society because of costs and other factors. See Erin
Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the
Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 615 (2007).
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theory, creates an efficient marketplace where local govern-
ments compete for residents and businesses by providing a de-
sirable set of goods and services. 59
With the exception of Tiebout's theory, public choice ig-
nores the role of citizens in government decision-making.
Moreover, the role of the citizen that Tiebout does recognize is
an extremely limited one of exit and entry rather than en-
gagement, deliberation, and negotiation. At best, public choice
theory envisions interest groups bargaining and reaching
agreements to help bring about certain local government deci-
sion-making results that benefit them. 60 At worst, public
choice theorists posit that consensus among divergent interest
groups on governmental decisions can only be reached through
deception, manipulation, and horse trading. 61
Thus, implicit in the public choice perspective is a rejection
of the notion that community stakeholders can and should;
communicate with one another regarding their needs, inter-
ests, and values; change one another's views or positions
through dialogue; and reach consensus on a decision that is in
the public interest. 62 Instead, the conclusion of a local gov-
ernment decision-making process is one that merely reflects a
temporary political judgment based on relative conditions and
power dynamics in society or, at most, an aggregation of indi-
vidual and group preferences. 63
This perspective also suggests that there is nothing wrong
with current levels of civic disengagement because it theorizes
that it is the product of an efficient marketplace. In other
words, public choice assumes that if individuals feel strongly
enough about the common good, they will engage in collective
action. Accordingly, weak public participation in local govern-
ment decision-making suggests to a public choice theorist that
people are either satisfied or at least satisfied enough, having
calculated that the costs of participating are not worth the po-
tential reward. 64 In short, public choice theory views the lack
59. See Tiebout, supra note 58, at 419-20.
60. See Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141
U. PA. L. REV. 801, 807-08 (1993) (presenting idea that public choice theory dis-
misses the notion that there is an a priori set of communal values).
61. See Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1507 (1988).
62. See id.
63. See Gey, supra note 60, at 808.
64. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539,
1546 (1988).
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of civic engagement as the result of rational choice and general
satisfaction.
However, as Part I of this Article detailed, many average
citizens would like to participate in their local government de-
cision-making but avoid doing so because they feel alienated
from the process. This suggests that civic disengagement re-
flects dissatisfaction and frustration with government, not si-
lent approval. If this is correct, then public choice theory's so-
lutions are no solutions at all. On the contrary, lack of civic
engagement creates the preconditions for local governments
that lack transparency and community oversight, are subject to
greater incidence of capture, and produce illegitimate local
government outputs.
B. Civic Republicanism
The fact that public choice theory largely accepts the
status quo is reason enough to reject it as a model of local gov-
ernment. A government plagued by actual and perceived ille-
gitimacy must be changed as well as explained. Public choice
theory fails to advocate for change by positing that the current
state of disengagement is a more or less rational state of af-
fairs. This view is, however, inconsistent with our democratic
ideal that government is accountable to all of its citizens, not
just to those who have the luxury of power, money, and connec-
tions. Instead of continuing on our current course, we should
strive for a model of local government that is infused with the
values of civic republicanism.
Civic republicanism envisions local government as a delib-
erative democracy whereby community stakeholders engage
with one another in a dialogic process to identify the needs of
the community and the appropriate course of action that fur-
thers the common good. 65 In this way, civic republicanism in-
jects an indispensable third party in the process-the ordinary
citizen-and recognizes that in the absence of public discourse
among such citizens, local government decisions will be driven
by private and factionalized interests.66 To a civic republican,
65. Id. at 1554-55. The terms "common good" or "public good" are inextrica-
bly linked to virtue or "civic virtue" in civic republican literature. See, e.g., Kath-
leen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713, 1713 (1988).
66. See S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Val-
ues, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685, 706 (1991).
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then, disengagement is both a symptom and a cause of a seri-
ous problem that undermines government's appropriate role
vis-A-vis its citizens. Fostering engagement, on the other hand,
encourages positive government outputs and reduces public
disenchantment.
Local governments, especially, can provide a forum for
public discourse and a deliberative democracy. 67 Civic republi-
canism has roots that hearken back to Aristotle, who argued
for this model of government within the context of the Greek
"communal city-state." 68 In ancient Greece, it was the boule-
or "council"-rather than the assembly that was the policy-
making entity for the community. 69 This governmental struc-
ture was attributable to the recognition that the boule could
serve as a forum for deliberation that was at the core of Athe-
nian democracy. 70 In the early years of our nation, civic repub-
licanism was best embodied in town halls which, like the boule,
resembled a gathering of neighbors rather than of the citizens
of a larger state or nation. Within this local setting, commu-
nity stakeholders come together to share ideas and understand
different perspectives. 71 Such community deliberation may re-
veal to the collection of stakeholders their common values and
help to identify norms greater than self-interest: the public
67. See Joseph Lubinski, Countering Majoritarian Politics: Challenging State-
wide Initiatives at the Local Level, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLy 85, 88 (2004).
Community dialogue can occur in settings both public and private: neighborhood
or civic associations, places of employment, block parties, government entities'
meetings, and other such locations. Gerald Frug refers to the ability to deliberate
with members of one's community in this manner as "public freedom." Frug, su-
pra note 8, at 1068. But as this Article argues, such dialogue should occur within
formal, recognized, and legitimized substructures of local government.
68. See Stefan Kapsch & Peter Steinberger, The Impact on Legislative Com-
mittees and Legislative Processes of the Use of the Initiative in the American West,
34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 689, 696 (1998).
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. The deliberative process brings a diverse community to consensus, but not
through horse trading and deal-making as we see in local governments viewed
through a public choice lens. See Bennett, supra note 31, at 409. As Cass Sun-
stein explains, in a deliberative democracy, "political outcomes should be produced
by an extended process of deliberation and discussion, in which new information
and new perspectives are brought to bear." Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative
Substance, 1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 612 (1991). While this process involves participa-
tion by a broad and diverse group of community stakeholders, it does not consist
of merely aggregating different preferences "precisely because preferences have
themselves been created by legal rules." Bennett, supra note 31, at 409 (quoting
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 11 (1993)).
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good.72 For civic republicans, such critical norms can only be
developed and reached through this dialogic discernment proc-
ess; they cannot be ascertained solely through the reflection of
an individual political actor. 73
Civic republicanism not only offers the possibility of better
government, but also of better citizens and healthier communi-
ties. Community stakeholders are given the opportunity to
confront one another-with their own biases, formed opinions,
parochial interests, individualism, and differing experiences
and cultural backgrounds-and transform themselves, their
preferences, their intentions, and the community by searching
for commonly held values, generating those public values, and
agreeing upon the common good. 74 In this way, those who
72. The common good is not the aggregation of various stakeholders' inter-
ests, but rather the qualitatively different concept of the community consensus
regarding the common good derived from such dialogic politics. See Mark Sei-
denfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1511, 1528-29 (1992).
73. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 183
(1982) (observing that "when politics goes well, we can know a good in common
that we cannot know alone"). In fact, as Clayton Gillette notes, voting without a
dialogic process leads to self-interested voting patterns that place minority views
and interests in a vulnerable state. See Gillette, supra note 35, at 954-56. Nor is
the initiative process properly informative, as it also is not deliberative. See
Daniel M. Warner, Direct Democracy: The Right of the People to Make Fools of
Themselves; The Use and Abuse of Initiative and Referendum, A Local Govern-
ment Perspective, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 47, 77-78 (1995) (noting that initiatives
are written by a small group of people-devoid of debate or compromise-and are
susceptible to oversimplification of the issues and appeals to prejudice, rather
than the common good). As Candice Hoke points out, voting alone cannot prop-
erly inform government decision-making because it is not derived from the trans-
formative deliberative process mentioned above. Hoke, supra note 66, at 709.
Clayton Gillette echoes this sentiment in questioning whether voting can ever re-
flect the actual aggregate preferences of a community. See Gillette, supra note 35,
at 933. While nothing precludes voters from discussing issues they must decide
on, voters tend not to do so. See id. at 945. Moreover, voters merely choose be-
tween limited options rather than discuss a range of proposals and select one or
more from the myriad brought up in the dialogic process.
74. See Feldman, supra note 31. When participants in the community dia-
logue change their minds, civic republicans view this change as part of the trans-
formative process of a deliberative democracy. The change is not the result of co-
ercion, but rather it comes from a normative understanding of the needs of the
community as gleaned from the dialogic process. As John Stuart Mill explains,
participation is the key to this transformative process: "the practical part of the
political education of a free people, taking them out of the narrow circle of per-
sonal and family selfishness and accustoming them to the comprehension of joint
interests, the management of joint concerns-habituating them to act from public
or semi-public motives and guide their conduct by aims which unite instead of iso-
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choose to engage in the dialogic process are encouraged to re-
flect critically on their own preferences, allowing others' view-
points to move and shape them as their perspectives do so to
others-the result being a more integrated and unified com-
munity.75 Moreover, by strengthening community relation-
ships and fostering participation, the dialogic process renders it
more likely that decisions will be accepted, even by those who
may not fully agree with it.76
To be sure, the civic republican model is an ideal. Some
difficult challenges must be overcome for the process to yield
agreement on the common good. For example, the process
must be open to and include a diverse cross-section of the local
community-people with different cultural backgrounds, val-
ues, and interests. 77 These different perspectives, while diffi-
cult to gather, are necessary for the deliberating community to
awaken to the true needs of the collective whole. Moreover,
community stakeholders must be equal in their participation in
the dialogic process; historic disparities among socio-economic
or racial groups in society and/or the political process must be
eliminated for the outcomes to be successful and accepted by
lating them from one another." JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 170 (Everyman
ed. 2003).
75. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What Is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?,
102 HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1721 (1989). While the dialogic process helps partici-
pants mold each other and their communities, the resulting formulation of the
common good requires that each member of the community is concomitantly sub-
ject to these collective values. See Hoke, supra note 66, at 704.
76. Gey, supra note 60, at 858-59; see also Seidenfeld, supra note 72, at 1529
("Through the transformative power of politics, citizens are able to define the
community norms that restrict the behavior of all community members, yet all
accept as just."); Cynthia V. Ward, The Limits of "Liberal Republicanism": Why
Group-Based Remedies and Republican Citizenship Don't Mix, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
581, 584-585 (1991) ("The ideal of contemporary republican citizenship is not ini-
tial agreement on substantive issues, but belief in the consensual possibilities of
deliberative dialogue."). But see Gillette, supra note 35, at 934 (questioning
whether individuals can truly understand and set aside their preferences and not
act in their own self-interest, while also recognizing that a deliberative process
may enlighten people as to their own irrational motives and prejudices).
77. See Stephen M. Feldman, Whose Common Good? Racism in the Political
Community, 80 GEO. L.J. 1835, 1849-55 (1992). Civic republicans do not ignore
cultural differences and private self-interest. Rather, they see these characteris-
tics as necessary to be shared with others, discussed and empathized with, and
ultimately used in the dialogic process to help inform the collective discernment of
the public good. Kathleen Sullivan calls this goal of gathering a diverse cross-
section of the community "rainbow republicanism." See Sullivan, supra note 65,
at 1714.
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the community. 78 Again, such equality among citizens may
prove to be elusive.
In addition, citizens must have meaningful points of access
to local government decision-makers in order to inform the de-
cisions that affect their day-to-day lives. 79 Similarly, local gov-
ernment decision-makers must be open to, communicate with,
and engage in the community dialogue. Government officials
must also explain their decisions to this group and demonstrate
how they advance the public good. Such transparency helps
ensure that government decisions are not made to advance the
interests of a few, but rather the community as a whole.80 Oth-
erwise, the process may devolve into yet another avenue to ad-
vance the interests of existing groups that already dominate
the political process.81
This is not to say that interest groups are always bad for
the political process from a civic republican perspective. Inter-
est groups can serve a valuable role in consolidating citizens
with similar goals and perspectives and streamlining their in-
put into the local political process.8 2 Moreover, representatives
78. See Sunstein, supra note 64, at 1541.
79. See Michael A. Fitts, Look Before You Leap: Some Cautionary Notes on
Civic Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1651, 1656 (1988). This approach to local gov-
ernment decision-making resonates with basic tenets of American democracy: "to
incorporate citizen participation in policy making and program delivery is to take
seriously the rights and responsibilities of citizens to have some control over poli-
cies that will have an impact on their lives." Chaskin & Garg, supra note 18, at
633. The practical effect of such civic participation is the creation of better poli-
cies, programs, and services that inspire public confidence and approval. More-
over, the community's collective stewardship of local government decisions and
policies stemming from the deliberative process has more legitimacy than indi-
vidual interests attempting to use the government decision-making process for
their own personal advantage. See Hoke, supra note 66, at 705.
80. See Seidenfeld, supra note 72, at 1530. Even assuming that some elected
officials endeavor for the public good-freed of the political pressures of reelection
and political self-perpetuation-it seems unlikely that all of the elected officials
would be so common-good-oriented. Nevertheless, such transparency is valuable
regardless of the number of such noble public servants.
81. See Feldman, supra note 31, at 2243-44. As Frank Michelman explains,
"the pursuit of political freedom through law depends on 'our' constant reach for
inclusion of the other, of the hitherto excluded-which in practice means bringing
to legal-doctrinal presence the hitherto absent voices of emergently self-conscious
social groups." Michelman, supra note 61, at 1529. Nor does civic republicanism
embrace majoritarianism. Civic republicanism thus rejects majoritarianism-a
"winners" and "losers" approach to politics. Instead, government exists to allow
for community stakeholders to deliberate about decision and policies and to reach
consensus for the common good. Seidenfeld, supra note 72, at 1514.
82. Nor does there necessarily need to be a negative connotation to the term
"interest group." Indeed, many of the interest groups that may participate in such
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from interest groups can communicate with their members re-
garding the policies and decisions adopted by their local gov-
ernment.8 3 However, such interests groups must engage in the
dialogic process with the goal of informing others of their views
and goals, not intransigently pursuing their private interests.
In other words, instead of dominating the decision-making
process, interest groups should enjoy the same status as that of
other community stakeholders. And like any other stake-
holder, interest groups must remain open to agreeing to a solu-
tion that may not directly advance their cause but that the col-
lective whole believes advances the common good. 84
This civic republican model begs the question of whether
one hundred percent community participation is even possible
in contemporary society. As Steven Gey points out, classic civic
republicanism favored small communities that were easier to
organize and where the essential familiarizing and bonding
could occur among citizens in order to reach a consensus as to
the common good and then protect such values from outside
pressures.8 5 A more modern view of civic republicanism real-
izes the impossibility of replicating this model. Instead, it em-
braces a more modest goal of providing individuals and repre-
sentatives of different stakeholder groups with genuine
avenues for engagement with their government, even if they
choose not to take advantage of them. In this regard, civic re-
publicanism does not require forced or total community par-
ticipation, just the meaningful opportunity for it.86
III. PAST ATTEMPTS AT LOCAL CIVIC ENGAGEMENT
Given the importance of public participation to democratic
legitimacy and good decision-making, it strikes one as odd that
more opportunities for civic engagement and community delib-
eration are not available. In fact, federal, state, and local gov-
ernments have attempted in the past to create means for citi-
a dialogic process are critical stakeholders in the community: religious groups,
civic associations, labor unions, homeless organizations, and others.
83. Seidenfeld, supra note 72, at 1530. But see Sullivan, supra note 65, at
1719 (arguing that private voluntary associations pose a threat to republicanism).
84. As I will discuss later in this Article, it remains to be seen whether it is
realistic to expect interest groups to set aside their own interests-even occasion-
ally-for the betterment of the common good.
85. Gey, supra note 60, at 814-15.
86. See id. at 819-20.
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zen participation. However, with a few exceptions such efforts
have largely failed to provide for meaningful, sustained, and
broad public participation in government decision-making. 87
Analysis of these failures (beginning with the War on Poverty
programs)-as well as some successes-provides valuable les-
sons for crafting lasting and effective models for civic engage-
ment at the local level.
In conjunction with the federal government, many cities
started programs to engage citizens in local government proc-
esses during the federal War on Poverty programs of the 1960s
and 1970s, which were established by the Economic Opportu-
nity Act of 1964. The War on Poverty programs encouraged
"maximum feasible participation" by the poor in decisions that
affected their communities.88 This emphasis led to the creation
of Community Action Programs and Community Development
Corporations, which were intended to facilitate more involve-
ment of poor citizens in redevelopment efforts, such as opening
supermarkets, engaging in business enterprise, and building or
rehabilitating housing.89 These programs envisioned
neighborhoods as the focal point for reform and for understand-
ing and addressing problems plaguing urban areas. To that
end, they sought to structure new opportunities for citizens-
particularly those traditionally disenfranchised-to participate
in local (and to a lesser degree federal) government decision-
making.
Unfortunately, administrators for the War on Poverty pro-
grams-both at the federal and local levels-had little experi-
ence creating and fostering deliberative processes. There was
minimal participation in these programs, due in part to skepti-
cism that such economic development efforts would be any
more successful than in the past and thus waste citizens'
time.90 The programs also struggled because of heightened ex-
87. And even those successes have distinct limitations. See infra text accom-
panying notes 98-110.
88. Robert R. Alford & Roger Friedland, Public Participation and Public Pol-
icy, ANN. REV. Soc., 429, 455-57 (1975). The federal Model Cities Program was
very similar to these models, but also met the same unsuccessful fate. See James
W. Lowe, Note, Examination of Governmental Decentralization in New York City
and a New Model for Implementation, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 173, 202-03 (1990).
89. See Alford & Friedland, supra note 88, at 455-57; see also Ellickson, supra
note 31, at 86-87.
90. Alford & Friedland, supra note 88, at 455-56.
[Vol. 79
HeinOnline  -- 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 158 2008
CIVIC REPUBLICANISM
pectations and inadequate funding. 9 1 These programs never
fulfilled their potential and wound up having little impact on
changing the functioning of government agencies or in success-
fully engaging citizens. 92 These programs failed in their en-
tirety by the mid- to late-1970s.
Despite these failures, the federal government-and by ex-
tension local governments-attempted to spur more neighbor-
hood planning and civic engagement in the 1980s and 1990s
through major decentralization programs for urban revitaliza-
tion. These levels of government collaborated to create territo-
rially based formal substructures of local government-such as
business improvement districts (BIDs)-that were created for
specific purposes: namely taxation, services, and regulation.
These programs continue to exist today. However, they are not
designed in accordance with civic republicanism in that public
participation in these programs stems from individuals orga-
nizing to pursue a common self-interest. In the case of a BID,
for example, business owners band together to collect and
spend money raised through additional property assessments
for property owners in a certain designated geographic region.
The group uses this money to pay for additional services like
private security and street beautification. 93 Moreover, once the
BID is established, a board of directors takes over its opera-
tions and the collective action and engagement of the group
dissipates.
To be sure, entities like BIDs are successful in involving
some community stakeholders in local governance. 94 But their
success is limited because their membership is restricted. For
example, BIDs are usually only open to property owners, ex-
cluding businesses, renters, and other community stake-
holders. Moreover, these local government substructures en-
gage only single-interest stakeholders-with BIDs, business
owners. They also usually only focus on one issue-e.g., im-
proving business conditions within the BID's boundaries. In
91. Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Grassroots Consensus Building and Collaborative
Planning, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 709, 713 (2000).
92. See Alford & Friedland, supra note 88, at 457; see also Neil Gilbert, Maxi-
mum Feasible Participation? A Pittsburgh Encounter, SOC. WORK, 84, 91-92
(1969) (providing a case study in Pittsburgh suggesting few successes with the
programs seeking maximum feasible participation).
93. Mark S. Davies, Business Improvement Districts, 52 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 187, 191-92 (1997).
94. Briffault, supra note 29, at 531.
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this sense, these substructures fail to engage an array of com-
munity stakeholders in a connected and coordinated system
that promotes long-term and sustainable change and policy-
making. Thus, they are generally insufficient to spur greater
and broader civic engagement in cities. 95
At the same time, cities also provided new opportunities
for public participation through neighborhood services centers,
city hall annexes, and expanded constituent service depart-
ments-all of which survive today.96 While these avenues give
residents some sense of participating in the decision-making
process, such opportunities have minimal impact on policies
and services because citizens do not interact directly with those
making the decisions and because citizens do not speak in a
collective voice. Citizens may have realized the inefficacy of
these avenues for participation because during this same pe-
riod, cities experienced a dramatic increase in community ac-
tivism and neighborhood group organization. Termed the
"backyard revolution," this period saw the establishment of
more private neighborhood groups that formed to advocate for
better services and to oppose what they deemed to be undesir-
able land use decisions that affected their communities. 97
These groups are entities separate from local government
and form to advance the interests of the neighborhood resi-
dents in local government decision-making. In general, after
an initial surge of interest, resident involvement is usually
quite low, with only board members and a few gadflys attend-
ing meetings. However, when a particular land use decision
threatens the character or quality of life in the community,
95. Id. at 522 (questioning the effectiveness of sublocal government structures
like BIDs, empowerment zones, and tax increment financing districts because of
their targeted purposes).
96. Richard J. Cole, Citizen Participation in Municipal Politics, AM. J. POL.
SCI., 761, 761 (1975).
97. William H. Simon, The Community Economic Development Movement,
2002 WIS. L. REV. 377, 388 (2002) (citing HARRY C. BOYTE, THE BACKYARD
REVOLUTION: UNDERSTANDING THE NEW CITIZEN MOVEMENT (1980)). Ironically,
at this same time, communities also experienced the decline in secondary associa-
tions within which neighbors meet and socialize, like the Boy Scouts and bowling
leagues. See generally PUTNAM, supra note 4, at 1. Putnam argues that the
strength of a democratic society rests in citizens' associational life, which en-
hances "social capital," promotes civic engagement, and thus strengthens democ-
racy. Id. The decline of such secondary associations, then, depletes social capital,
weakens democracy, and creates new barriers for collective action. So these in-
formal networks that begot social capital gave way to community groups focused
on narrow issues.
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perhaps one that increases traffic dramatically or poses envi-
ronmental or health risks, the neighborhood group once again
becomes flush with active residents who mobilize to oppose the
project. 98 These neighborhood groups have often proved suc-
cessful in fighting such projects-so much so that a new word
was coined to describe their attitude: NIMBYism ("Not In My
Back Yard"). But once the project has been defeated, the
throngs of residents disband, and the group remains active
largely in name only until another such threat or problem pre-
sents itself. Moreover, while such a group may be successful in
bringing to light a particular issue in the immediate, this ap-
proach often fails to consider long-term effects of their goals. 99
Other self-interested, singularly-focused community groups
such as environmental organizations, chambers of commerce,
and the like experience similar limitations.
Like business-oriented substructures of local government,
the problem with this model of civic participation is that these
groups of stakeholders mobilize and unite around a single issue
that directly affects them. Such involvement in local govern-
ment affairs is solely self-interested, outcome-oriented, and of-
tentimes campaign-based. Moreover, it usually does not mix,
say, residents from the neighborhood group with other commu-
nity members who have a stake in the area, such as educators,
environmentalists, and others. Those involved for such a fleet-
ing issue do not communicate with others to understand the
needs of the community at large and to inform government de-
cision-makers about the interests of the collective whole.
Rather, they push their individual agenda and attempt to in-
fluence the decision-making process through mobilizing and
lobbying. And since the group quickly disbands after resolu-
tion of an issue, the lessons of collective action and community
98. Harold A. Ellis, Neighborhood Opposition and the Permissible Purposes of
Zoning, 7 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 275, 275 (1992); see also Carol M. Rose, Plan-
ning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71
CAL. L. REV. 837, 863 (1983). Indeed, this incidence is perhaps exacerbated by the
mandatory public participation requirements in many land use decisions. See
William A. Fischel, Voting, Risk Aversion, and the NIMBY Syndrome: A Comment
on Robert Nelson's "Privatizing the Neighborhood", 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 881,
881-83 (1999).
99. Salsich, supra note 91, at 732-33. Such voluntary associations oftentimes
face significant barriers to entry as their efforts to raise money and to build and
galvanize membership are frequently plagued by free riding. See Ellickson, supra
note 31, at 86.
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involvement are not extended to other issues facing the com-
munity as a whole. 100
These programs, which lead to semi-permanent and ad hoc
public participation, appear to fit the public choice model of
government decision-making. Single-issue, short-term groups
are largely reactive. Instead of informing the policy- and deci-
sion-making process as it unfolds, these groups enter public life
only in reaction to a result or threat-either intended or unin-
tended-that they find untenable. This intermittent form of
civic engagement may be reflective of the costs of political and
collective action. Transaction costs such as time spent not
working or not with one's family, and overhead costs for run-
ning such an active community organization, may prove too
high for anything but those crisis situations where the personal
costs of collective inaction far exceed those of collective ac-
tion. 101 As a consequence, policymakers make decisions with,
at best, the information of those who manage to involve them-
selves in the currently insulated local government processes.
The governmental output thus lacks properly informed inputs
from a broad cross-section of stakeholders who are not crisis-
driven.
Many current methods to engage the community demon-
strate the problems that exacerbate citizens' feelings of discon-
nectedness and lack of responsiveness from their local govern-
ment. Typically, local governments interact with and engage
local communities through two methods. The "try-and-sell"
method, which involves no real community participation, 10 2
consists of local government agencies making a decision and
then attempting to "sell" it-after the fact-to local communi-
ties through public meetings and other interactions. 103 The
100. See, e.g., Potapchuk et al., supra note 30, at 17 (noting that the City of
Denver's effective community governance is restricted to economic development
projects and does not reach other areas of interest to the community).
101. As discussed further in Part IV.C., the question of time may be the most
significant barrier to neighborhood council success.
102. See Frank Benest, Serving Customers or Engaging Citizens: What is the
Future of Local Government?, 78 PUB. MGMT. A6, A8 (1996).
103. For example, a city might make a decision to privatize its trash collection
service without providing meaningful input from its citizens. Elected officials
would then speak at community group meetings after the decision was made in an
attempt to build support for the decision by delineating all of the positives of the
privatization move. Such an approach-even if correct on the merits-can alien-
ate constituents who will inevitably feel as though decisions affecting their day-to-
day lives were made without their input. Citizens might also feel insulted that
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"try-and-sell" method has had little success with neighborhood
groups or the community at large, generating a negative reac-
tion and fostering mistrust in the decision-making process. 104
The second approach is for local governments to create new
community groups or support existing neighborhood organiza-
tions to provide input regarding policy-making and the needs of
their communities. 105 These groups engage in discussions with
local government officials and agencies regarding community
concerns and approaches to solving neighborhood problems.
This approach creates partnerships between city governments
and neighborhood groups, spurring community clean-up, anti-
drug, anti-gang, and after-school programs. 106 However, this
model primarily relies on existing community-based organiza-
tions. Local governments believe that these groups are embed-
ded institutions with mechanisms for inclusion and communi-
cation that can streamline representation of neighborhood
interests. 107 But this assumption seems to be unfounded.
First, as described above, these groups are usually singularly
focused and do not engage a meaningful cross-section of the
community. Second, rather than emerging as grassroots re-
sponses to local needs, these existing groups are established, at
least in part, by outside organizations, such as government
elected officials assume that community members will feel a sense of ownership in
the decision if the elected officials come "cheerlead" at such a meeting.
104. See Benest, supra note 102. Local residents complain about traditional
models of public information dissemination, seeking a more honest form of two-
way communications between neighborhoods and city government. See Frisby &
Bowman, supra note 13, at 4. Residents believe that public meetings, such as
"meet your local government official day," are more of a public relations opportu-
nity for officials rather than a meaningful sharing of information. Such artificial
shared governance relationships anger local communities. When invited to par-
ticipate in community meetings with local officials, residents want an assurance
that their opinions will be heard, valued, and used in the policy-making process.
See id.
105. See Benest, supra note 102, at A9. In Brea, California, public officials of-
ten attend homeowners association meetings to inform residents of and seek their
input on new policy initiatives or to gain their support for recycling, fire preven-
tion, or crime resistance programs. See Frank Benest, Creating Neighborhood
Connections, 72 PUB. MGMT. 6, 7 (1990) [hereinafter Benest, Creating Neighbor-
hood Connections]. This type of relationship demonstrates an effective informa-
tion dissemination and collecting model of city government to neighborhood rela-
tionship.
106. See Benest, supra note 102, at A9; see also Benest, supra note 105, at 6
(explaining how local governments have teamed with homeowners associations to
counter gangs and drug dealers in their communities, as well as to take back local
parks and community centers).
107. See Chaskin & Garg, supra note 18, at 634.
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agencies or corporations, in need of information, support, or le-
gitimacy in the neighborhood. 108 Third, a small group of local
elites often run these organizations-a phenomenon referred to
as the "iron law of oligarchy."109 These elite leaders operate
with few mechanisms of communication with, or accountability
to, the residents at large. 110 These issues demonstrate that
these existing groups do not understand, represent, or concern
themselves with the needs and concerns of the community as a
whole for which they claim to speak
These two approaches are designed in the "vending ma-
chine" mode of engagement. It finds citizens complacently ac-
quiescing to pay an allotted amount of taxes and fees and in re-
turn receiving a corresponding value of services from their local
governments. I1 I In this regard, local governments view citi-
zens as passive consumers rather than as active participants in
the community decision-making process. Although some of the
approaches mentioned above seek community input, neighbor-
hood groups still do not have an official, institutional role in
city government policy-making. In these models, local govern-
ment officials often merely gather information from these
groups rather than engage them in designing or crafting city
policies. Moreover, these groups do not interact with one an-
other as part of a larger, deliberative approach to local gov-
ernment decision-making.
Finally, some scholars see the suburbs and common inter-
est communities (CIC)1 12-with their accompanying homeown-
ers associations-as models for public participation. 113 While
108. Id. at 634-35.
109. Id. See generally ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL
STUDY OF THE OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY 15 (1958)
(describing the "iron law of oligarchy" theory that political and governmental or-
ganizations will inevitably be taken over by self-perpetuating elites).
110. See MICHELS, supra note 109.
111. See Hansell, supra note 16, at 9.
112. CICs are residential developments-planned unit developments, condo-
miniums, and cooperatives-where all units are subject to private land use cove-
nants, conditions, and restrictions and are governed by a private homeowners as-
sociation. CICs are separate, yet complementary entities to local government that
supplement the goods and services that cities, counties, and other local govern-
ments provide to residents.
113. See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519 (1982) (arguing for more local control to neighborhood
homeowners associations); Ellickson, supra note 31, at 75 (making the case for
Block Improvement Districts and Neighborhood Improvement Districts based off
of the popular Business Improvements Districts); Liebmann, supra note 24;
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some research suggests that citizens participate more in sub-
urbs than in cities, 114 other scholars suggest otherwise. 115
Moreover, suburbs are not microcosms of large, diverse cities.
Rather, they are homogenous-in terms of race, ethnicity, and
socio-economic status-and oftentimes represent the "favored
quarter" of regional populations. 116 Similarly, CICs are limited
in terms of their universal usefulness as a model of civic en-
gagement because they are largely limited to the affluent who
can afford to opt out of ordinary government goods and ser-
vices. 117 As Wayne Hyatt notes, such communities are often
"enclaves of wealth and privilege" that are coercive, not volun-
tary.118 Moreover, attendance and participation in homeown-
Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning
with Private Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 827, 832 (1999) (same). The basis for these positions stems from a defense
of property-a common mantra that underlies many decentralization arguments.
However, local government and our conception of community involve far more
than merely defending individual property rights.
114. Briffault, "What About the 'Ism?", supra note 20, at 435.
115. See Oliver, supra note 11, at 190 (noting that more affluent neighborhoods
may experience lower civic participation due to "fewer social needs").
116. ORFIELD, supra note 31, at 1 (detailing the successes of the "favored quar-
ter"); Cashin, supra note 19, at 1897 (noting that suburbs represent approxi-
mately 25% of a region's population, but that this quarter of the population suc-
ceeds in obtaining or securing the largest share of the region's infrastructure
improvements).
117. See Timothy Egan, The Serene Fortress: A Special Report; Many Seek Se-
curity in Private Communities, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1995 (citing Canyon Lake,
California, as an example of a private, incorporated city that is not open to the
public); see also Canyon Lake Home Page, http://www.cityofcanyonlake.com. This
is also to say nothing of the potential impact such a privatization revolution would
have on existing cities and their ability to maintain a tax base to provide goods
and services to those remaining in their boundaries who could not afford to opt
out in this manner, especially the poor. Moreover, cities are quite limited in their
powers to begin with, so the powers that could be decentralized to local substruc-
tures of government are also, by definition, limited. Lowe, supra note 88, at 183;
see also Richard C. Schragger, Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak Cities? On the
Power of Local Executives in a Federal System, 115 YALE L.J. 2542, 2556-64
(2006) (noting the cities' lack of power in our federal system). In addition, to the
degree that such models seek to privatize local land use decision-making, they
may run afoul of the legal protection that ensures that the government cannot
transfer its police power. See Steven J. Eagle, Privatizing Land Use Regulations:
The Problem of Consent, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 905, 919 (1999) (citing Carlino v.
Whitpain Investors, 453 A.2d 1385, 1388 (Pa. 1982)); see also Clayton P. Gillette,
Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 190, 224 (2001) ("Local
government law retains a significant nondelegation doctrine that limits its deci-
sion-making authority to locally elected officials.").
118. Wayne S. Hyatt, Common Interest Communities: Evolution and Reinven-
tion, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 303, 311-12 (1998) ("[B]ecause the range of housing
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ers associations tend to be low. 119 When residents do engage
with one another, it is often over petty disputes such as paint-
ing one's house a particular color, not maintaining one's lawn
properly, or some other violation of a covenant. 120 Given the
restrictiveness and conformity of CICs, it is no surprise that
collective action rarely occurs and that participation is low. 121
In this regard, while suburbs or CICs may prove valuable as
supplemental efforts to broader civic engagement initiatives,
they ultimately fail to fill the void in our democracy and local
government decision-making process.
The failed and limited programs of the past demonstrate
that for meaningful and lasting change to occur, diverse stake-
holders from across a community must establish collaborative
relationships through a dialogic process to help reach consen-
sus on the public good. Such efforts must be proactive and sus-
tained, rather than reactive and crisis-driven. They must be
structured as a formal part of the local government policy- and
decision-making process so as to provide genuine access and to
inform decision-makers about the needs and wants of the com-
munity as a whole. Systemic changes, long-term planning, and
responsive policy-making-all hallmarks of good local govern-
ment--can only be accomplished through a paradigmatic shift
in civic engagement. 122 The remainder of the Article explores
the advent of neighborhood councils, which embrace many of
the values of civic republicanism and may signal such a shift in
paradigm for local governance.
IV. NEIGHBORHOOD COUNCILS
A. Structure
With the failure of past attempts at increasing public par-
ticipation, local governments have created promising new sub-
structures that aim to engage community stakeholders, both
choices is limited, individuals become subject to community association govern-
ance by necessity rather than by fully informed choice.").
119. Clayton Gillette, Court, Covenants, and Communities, 61 U. CHI. L. REV.
1375, 1403 (1994). Such lack of involvement may stem from homeowners' general
satisfaction in such homogenous communities where expectations and standards
of living are somewhat predetermined.
120. Id.
121. Hyatt, supra note 118, at 360-61.
122. Potapchuk et al., supra note 30, at 4.
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with one another and, ultimately, as part of the policy- and de-
cision-making process: neighborhood councils. 12 3  The New
York City Charter's explanation of its neighborhood councils
provides a representative overview of the purposes of these en-
tities: neighborhood councils exist "for the planning of commu-
nity life within the city, the participation of citizens in city gov-
ernment within their communities, and the efficient and
effective organization of agencies that deliver municipal ser-
vices in local communities and boroughs."'124 Although the
structure and work of neighborhood councils vary from city to
city, their general goals are the same: to bring together a broad
cross-section of the community to deliberate over various laws,
policies, and decisions ranging from land use and transporta-
tion matters to goods and service delivery and then to inform
the formal local government decision-making process with their
input. 125
Many questions naturally arise when considering whether
and how a local government should adopt neighborhood coun-
cils. How will neighborhood council boundaries be defined and
who should be allowed to participate? Should neighborhood
council leadership be elected or appointed? Should they be
formal or informal entities within local government? Should
neighborhood councils be advisory or have decision-making au-
thority? How neighborhood councils are formed and structured
will make a significant difference in terms of the community's
perception of their legitimacy and effectiveness.
1. Size and Boundaries
Cities differ as to what constitutes an appropriate size for
a neighborhood council. The City of Simi Valley, California,
created four neighborhood councils with approximately 25,000
123. While the official names of these entities vary from city to city, I use the
term "neighborhood council" to describe them as whatever name a city chooses,
the entities are very similar, if not identical, in nature.
124. N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 69 § 2700 (1989). Most cities create neighborhood
councils by ordinance or through their city charter. See BERRY ET AL., supra note
20, at 58 (noting that cities, like Portland, Oregon, created neighborhood councils
by ordinance). Other cities, such as Washington, D.C., created neighborhood coun-
cils in their city charters.
125. See, e.g., Benest, supra note 102, at A7 (explaining the purpose of Brea,
California, neighborhood councils); Salsich, supra note 91, at 717, 719-20 (de-
scribing Atlanta, Georgia, and Washington, D.C., neighborhood councils).
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residents per district. 126 In Los Angeles, California, neighbor-
hood councils average approximately 38,000 residents within
their boundaries.127 On the larger end, in New York City fifty-
nine neighborhood councils each represent an average of
125,000 residents. 128 Some cities have attempted to give flexi-
bility to communities in defining and shaping neighborhood
councils in order to allow for better representation of natural
neighborhoods. For example, the neighborhood council system
in Los Angeles is set up to address matters such as boundary
designation, structuring the neighborhood councils and their
boards of directors, and drafting by-laws for each community
that seeks to form such an entity. 129 New York City also drew
its neighborhood councils' boundaries to satisfy certain criteria,
such as conformity with historic neighborhoods and communi-
ties, suitability for the delivery of services, and population eq-
uity. 130
Early studies show that in order for neighborhood councils
to be effective, local governments should limit the scope of
neighborhood councils to geographic areas with relatively small
populations. 131 At the same time, they should remain flexible
so as to permit boundaries that track existing neighborhoods.
Smaller neighborhood councils allow for meaningful face-to-
face interaction between community stakeholders engaging in
a dialogic process, while flexibility allows such entities to re-
main true to natural communities with shared interests.
126. See Coll Metcalfe, Neighborhood Councils Put Their Stamp on City Issues,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1998, at B8.
127. JULIET MUSSO ET AL., UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA URBAN
INITIATIVE, NEIGHBORHOOD COUNCILS IN Los ANGELES: A MIDTERM STATUS
REPORT 1 (2004), http://urban.usc.edu/maindoc/downloads/ncmidterm.pdf.
128. See Richard Briffault, The New York City Charter and the Question of
Scale, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1059, 1064 (1998). New York City operates on a bor-
ough system. However, the large size of the boroughs-both geographically and in
terms of population-necessitated another approach to true community participa-
tion in local governance. See id. at 1063. Consequently, in 1961, the City of New
York created neighborhood councils-which they term community districts and
boards-to gain more meaningful neighborhood participation in the operation of
the city. See id. The City restricts neighborhood councils from encompassing
more than 250,000 residents in order to bring these entities closer to the commu-
nity than the boroughs. See id.
129. MUSSO ETAL., supra note 127, at 4.
130. See Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr. & Eric Lane, The Policy and Politics of
Charter-Making, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 723, 823 (1998).
131. BERRY ET AL., supra note 20, at 49 (concluding that successful neighbor-
hood councils covered smaller geographic regions that kept their representative
populations between 2,000 and 16,000 people).
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2. Who May Participate?
Eligibility to participate in neighborhood councils is often a
hotly debated topic. Traditional participation theory views in-
dividuals as being part of only one community: the one in
which they live. 132 And like most government entities,
neighborhood councils are inevitably structured according to
geography. However, many cities have attempted to be more
inclusive in their neighborhood council participants. In Los
Angeles, neighborhood councils can define for themselves the
diversity of their general membership. Definitions of eligible
community stakeholders vary widely among Los Angeles
neighborhood councils but often include "any individual who
lives, works, owns a business or owns property" within the
neighborhood council's boundaries; those who participate in
educational, religious, non-profit, or community organizations;
and members of senior groups, cultural groups, environmental
groups, fraternal organizations, and military/veteran organiza-
tions. 133 In Portland, Oregon, individuals from neighborhood
associations, churches, hospitals, businesses, and other seg-
ments of the community may participate in neighborhood coun-
cils. 134 In Atlanta, Georgia, residents and those who own prop-
erty, run a business, or work within the neighborhood councils'
boundaries are eligible for membership and voting rights
within these entities. 135
Determining who constitutes community stakeholders, and
thus who may participate in neighborhood councils, becomes a
critical question for the effectiveness and longevity of the coun-
cils. To gain legitimacy in the community and the broader city,
neighborhood councils must speak for a broad array of stake-
holders and their views-not just residents who live within the
boundaries, but others that have stakes in the community as
well. Accordingly, cities should consider adopting a self-
selection process whereby communities determine which
132. See Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Lo-
cal Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 413-14 (1993).
133. MUSSO ET AL., supra note 127, at app. 1.126. While membership of
neighborhood councils tends to be dominated by residents (homeowners and rent-
ers), businesses, religiously-affiliated organizations, educational organizations,
and representatives from social services also constitute significant percentages of
the membership. Id. at 9.
134. BERRY ET AL., supra note 20, at 66.
135. Salsich, supra note 91, at 717.
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stakeholders can participate in their neighborhood council.
This approach allows for a more holistic definition of "commu-
nity" in building neighborhood councils. Such horizontal inte-
gration in the community allows a diverse cross-section of
stakeholders-homeowners, tenants, community leaders, com-
mercial property owners, social service leaders, police represen-
tatives, students, educators, merchants, and others with vested
interest in the quality of life in the neighborhood-to partici-
pate in neighborhood councils. 136 It thereby provides for a
more representative entity for the entire stakeholder commu-
nity. Moreover, the self-selection process joins different per-
spectives, bodies of expertise, bases of knowledge, and access to
resources in the community.
This more inclusive vision is not unprecedented in local
government scholarship. Gerald Frug and Richard Thompson
Ford advocate for more expansive stakeholder inclusion on the
local level-one that departs from our normal conceptions of
residency voting and representation-through cross-border vot-
ing whereby non-residents could vote in local elections in areas
where they do not reside. 137 This view stems from the realities
of urban living: because many major metropolitan areas are
densely populated, decisions in one neighborhood may impose
externalities on surrounding communities. As such, a more in-
clusive definition of community stakeholder should make
sense, especially for neighborhood councils in densely popu-
lated cities.
136. Horizontal integration would also include neighborhood councils them-
selves communicating and engaging with one another to address citywide issues
which transcend more than just the metes and bounds of a particular neighbor-
hood council. Los Angeles attempts to achieve such horizontal integration
through its Congress of Neighborhoods, which aims to serve as a larger delibera-
tive forum for neighborhood councils to address citywide issues such as spending
priorities for city services, transportation, development, and other quality of life
matters. MUSSO ET AL., supra note 127, at Appendix 1.
137. Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography and
Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1908-09 (1994); Gerald Frug, Decenter-
ing Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 297 (1993). Of course, there is a
question of just how broadly a community might want to define itself. For exam-
ple, Erwin Chemerinsky notes that during his time as chairman of the Elected
Charter Reform Commission for the City of Los Angeles, the commission debated
the merits of including undocumented immigrants as part of neighborhood coun-
cils. Erwin Chemerinsky, Further Reflections of a Framer: The Los Angeles Char-
ter Reform Experience, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 125, 132 (2000).
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3. Leadership-Appointed or Elected?
Another controversy arises as to whether the leadership of
the neighborhood councils should be elected or appointed.
Neighborhood councils also have boards of directors that help
administer the work of the group. The number of directors var-
ies depending on the neighborhood council, ranging from five to
more than fifty.138 Moreover, some neighborhood councils des-
ignate certain director seats for particular stakeholder groups;
others hold general at-large elections or elections based on dis-
tricts within the neighborhood council's boundaries; and many
adopt a combination of two or more of these or other ap-
proaches.139 Other neighborhood councils have their directors
appointed by elected officials. 140
Both models of appointing or electing directors run into
normative and/or legal problems. For example, a policy of
elected officials appointing members to neighborhood councils
runs counter to the notion of a local independent body that is
truly representative of its community and that is more organi-
cally formed. Moreover, in such a model, appointed members
to these councils may feel loyalty and ties to the elected official
appointing them, thus preventing them from unfettered advo-
cacy and representation of their neighborhoods.
On the other hand, electing directors to neighborhood
councils' boards may fit the community-centered model of
neighborhood councils better in terms of being more authentic
138. For example, neighborhood councils' boards of directors in Los Angeles
range from five to fifty-one members, with an average of approximately twenty.
MUSSO ET AL., supra note 127, at app. 1. In New York City, neighborhood council
boards range from thirty to fifty members. See Briffault, supra note 128, at 1064.
In Portland, Oregon, neighborhood council boards contain between nine and
twenty-three members, while Washington, D.C.'s has eight members each.
139. See Ted Rohrlich, Neighborhood Power Is Key to Charter Debate, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 19, 1998, at Al (half of St. Paul's neighborhood councils elected their
representatives by district, while half elected them at large, and some councils
allocated board positions to particular representative groups, while others did
not); Salsich, supra note 91, at 719 (Washington, D.C., neighborhood council direc-
tors are elected every two years by single-member districts comprised of two thou-
sand residents).
140. Benest, Creating Neighborhood Connections, supra note 105, at 7 (Simi
Valley City Council appoints members to the neighborhood councils' boards); see
Briffault, supra note 128, at 1064 (discussing how in New York City, council
members and borough presidents appoint community activists, developers,
neighborhood leaders, political supporters, and other community members to
these boards for two-year terms).
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and representative of the broad cross-section of community
stakeholders. However, the election of neighborhood councils
with decision-making authority-discussed further below-
creates serious legal issues stemming from the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Avery v. Midland County, which
extended voting apportionment rules for state legislatures to
local governments. 141 In Avery, the Court held that locally rep-
resentative bodies with decision-making authority over those
within its boundaries must adhere to the one person/one vote
doctrine, although it also indicated that special-purpose sub-
structures of local government that focused on certain constitu-
ents more than others might be exempt from the rule. 142 The
key to this seeming paradox is the "Supreme Court's basic
premise ... that residents of a jurisdiction have an equal right
to participate in the election of their local government so long
as they are comparably affected by that government." 143 Nev-
ertheless, the Supreme Court has almost always limited the
right to vote only to those citizens who physically reside within
the jurisdiction, pointing out that such residency requirements
are necessary "to preserve the basic conception of a political
community." 144 Moreover, the Voting Rights Act would require
neighborhood councils to contain an equal number of residents,
the non-dilution of minority strength and balance, and the
compactness and other qualities designed to ensure fairness
and avoid discrimination against one segment of the popula-
tion. 145
141. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 480-84 (1968); see also Briffault,
supra note 132, at 397.
142. Avery, 390 U.S. at 480-83; see Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass'n,
Inc., 960 F. Supp. 760, 770-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that the one person/one
vote doctrine was inapplicable to the Grand Central Business Improvement Dis-
trict elections because of the district's limited purpose); see also Ball v. James, 451
U.S. 355, 368 (1981) (holding the one person/one vote doctrine inapplicable to wa-
ter reclamation district elections); Sayler Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 725-730 (1973) (upholding a California statute limit-
ing the right to vote to only landowners within the district).
143. See Briffault, supra note 132, at 397.
144. See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 82 (1978) (uphold-
ing a state law limiting the right to vote to only those residing within local gov-
ernment boundaries).
145. See generally Briffault, supra note 132. The Voting Rights Act would also
require the redistricting and redefining of neighborhoods every ten years. Such
redistricting could not be done solely on the basis of race. Instead, it must include
communities of interest, although minority voting rights must not be diminished
in the process. Id. at 403-04.
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In this regard, the prescriptions of the Voting Rights Act
and other legal limitations would render self-selected bounda-
ries for elected neighborhood councils an impossibility. Also,
cities would incur significant costs by sponsoring neighborhood
council elections and keeping the process consistent with the
Voting Rights Act. Finally, formal elections would only allow
registered voters to engage in the selection of the neighborhood
council members. Given the aforementioned attempts at com-
munity-wide inclusiveness, this prescription would most likely
limit the true representative nature of neighborhood councils
by limiting those who choose their members. Accordingly,
neighborhood councils should have either appointed boards of
directors or elected boards with no decision-making authority.
4. Advisory or Decision-Making Entities?
For the reasons just described, cities have understandably
tended to shy away from granting any decision-making author-
ity to neighborhood councils.146 When cities adopt neighbor-
hood councils, the debate about whether to grant such entities
decision-making authority or make them advisory is oftentimes
heated and controversial. On the one hand, formally empow-
ered neighborhood councils pose many problems. As Richard
Briffault points out, "[m]ore powerful community-based gov-
ernments would certainly add to already protracted process of
approving certain contracts and zoning changes, and would
probably make it more difficult for city government to take ac-
tion." 147 Neighborhood councils with land use authority may
reject many, if not all, development projects. 148 Many of these
projects may serve important city purposes-thus exacerbating
the NIMBYism problem.149 This protective approach to land
146. BERRY ET AL., supra note 20, at 159-60 (detailing how Portland's
neighborhood councils advise city officials about community development matters,
among other issues); id. at 160-61 (noting how St. Paul's neighborhood councils
advise city officials on land use, zoning, and planning matters); Salsich, supra
note 91, at 719-20 (noting that Washington, D.C., neighborhood councils advise
city officials on planning, social service, transportation, and other public policy
issues that affect their communities).
147. Briffault, supra note 128, at 1066.
148. Id.
149. Michael Wheeler, Negotiating NIMBY: Learning from the Failure of the
Massachusetts Siting Law, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 241, 244-50 (1994). Another prob-
lem related to NIMBYism arises in the likelihood that neighborhood councils with
such powers would not consider the loss of sales tax revenue that would come
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use decision-making could easily stunt development and
growth in the city, which-despite the already problematic is-
sues that many cities face-is undesirable. In addition, a city
would have to bear substantial legal liability for the actions of
decision-making neighborhood councils, even if higher authori-
ties could review such actions. Finally, neighborhood councils
with decision-making authority significantly increase the city's
costs related to the permitting and the planning processes. 150
On the other hand, questions arise as to whether commu-
nity stakeholders will engage in substructures of local govern-
ment like neighborhood councils if they do not have decision-
making authority. Richard Briffault, Gerald Frug, and other
prominent local government scholars argue that average citi-
zens will not engage in civic participation unless such decen-
tralized substructures of government have legal power. 151 Brif-
fault posits that citizens will perceive advisory entities as
ineffective and thus not worthy of their time and effort. 152 If
few in the community participate, then neighborhood councils
will fail like past efforts at civic engagement.
However, it is not necessary that neighborhood councils
have de jure decision-making power. To be sure, citizens will
not participate in neighborhood councils and other forms of
public participation if they believe that their efforts will not
change or craft public policy. 153  But so long as advisory
neighborhood councils wield sufficient de facto political power
to affect governmental outputs-laws, decisions, policies, etc.-
from denying development projects. Cities depend on expanded tax revenue from
such projects to fund city services and supplement the city's budget. A city council
or planning commission will be more likely to balance these competing considera-
tions and thus better serve the interests of the city as a whole.
150. Briffault, supra note 128, at 1066. If a neighborhood council acts in a
quasi-judicial capacity and thus must base its decisions upon evidence in the re-
cord and subsequent legally adequate findings, the neighborhood council will in-
crease costs by requiring staffing by city planning departments, city attorneys of-
fices, and other city departments involved in the land use process. Many projects
coming before neighborhood councils will require environmental review, requiring
additional professional staffing. Neighborhood councils would have to comply
with conflict-of-interest laws, as well as maintain sufficient safeguards to protect
the city from liability.
151. See Briffault, supra note 128, at 1066 ("Significant grass-roots participa-
tion would require real grass-roots power."); Frug, supra note 8, at 1070 ("No one
is likely to participate in the decisionmaking of an entity of any size unless that
participation will make a difference in his life.").
152. Briffault, supra note 128, at 1066.
153. Id.
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community stakeholders would still have an incentive to par-
ticipate.
Indeed, some neighborhood councils have been very suc-
cessful without the delegation of legal and governmental deci-
sion-making authority. 154 Just as lobbyists and interest groups
exert great power and influence over local government deci-
sion-making, so too can advisory neighborhood councils garner
similar effective influence without having formal decision-
making authority. In an advisory role, neighborhood councils
can inform city elected officials and administrative staff of their
wants, needs, and interests with regard to goods and service
delivery. Neighborhood councils can also hear land use devel-
opment proposals and make non-binding recommendations to
planning commissions, city councils, and other city entities
which adjudicate land use decisions. In this regard, if properly
integrated into local government decision-making-discussed
below-neighborhood councils can gain sufficient influence and
political power to attract community stakeholders to join and
participate.
5. Formal or Informal Roles in Local Government?
Most cities have created neighborhood councils as formal,
legal substructures of their local government and embedded
them as part of the administrative process in city decision-
making (despite being advisory). 155 This type of vertical inte-
gration situates neighborhood councils within the local gov-
ernment decision-making hierarchy and power structure of
elected officials, administrators, and bureaucrats. Moreover,
this structure provides neighborhood councils the opportunity
to provide input on and influence decisions that affect their
154. BERRY ET AL., supra note 20, at 177-80 (noting neighborhood councils'
considerable impact on local governmental outputs).
155. See, e.g., CHARTER OF THE CITY OF Los ANGELES § 900-14 (2000) (formally
incorporating neighborhood councils into city government and various decision-
making processes--on an advisory basis-such as the land use and planning proc-
ess, the delivery of city services, and city budgetary issues); Benest, supra note
102, at A7 (noting Simi Valley's incorporation of neighborhood councils into the
land use approval process); Briffault, supra note 128, at 1063 (same for New York
City). But see BERRY ET AL., supra note 20, at 58-59 (noting that though created
by city ordinance, St. Paul neighborhood councils are not agencies of the city and
instead are incorporated as 501(c)(3) non-profit organizations and operate under
their own set of by-laws).
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communities. 156 As an official part of local government, many
neighborhood councils receive budgets and staff in order to ful-
fill this role. 157
For neighborhood councils to succeed, local governments
should follow this blueprint when adopting these substructures
of local government. Communication between stakeholders
and government decision-makers-as described previously-
has been historically marked by distance, inefficiency, and
varying degrees of irrelevance. As formal entities in city gov-
ernment structure, neighborhood councils link community
stakeholders to these decision-makers and thus allow for mean-
ingful and timely feedback on local government laws, policies,
and decisions. In this regard, by incorporating neighborhood
councils into their respective governmental structures and de-
cision-making processes and by providing them with funding
and staff in order to fulfill their envisioned role, cities provide
neighborhood councils with institutional legitimacy, credibility
in the community, and more influence in their local govern-
ment.
B. Neighborhood Councils as a Model of Civic
Republicanism
While local governments may be the most fertile ground
for involving average citizens in government decision-making,
they are currently structured in a manner that cannot provide
a meaningful level of civic participation, except perhaps in the
156. This structure may also suggest that neighborhood councils ought to be
coterminous with city council districts. On the one hand, strict adherence to this
approach may be problematic as city council districts often do not correspond pre-
cisely with stakeholders' perceptions of the metes and bounds of different commu-
nities that might be logical boundaries for neighborhood councils. In this sense,
certain communities that share common interests may be divided up into more
than one neighborhood council because the community overlaps two or more city
council districts. On the other hand, matching neighborhood councils with exist-
ing city council districts allows for more clear channels through which neighbor-
hood councils-and their members--can influence local government decision-
makers.
157. See, e.g., BERRY ET AL., supra note 20, at 113 (detailing how Portland pro-
vides funds for neighborhood councils and offers them the use of city staff mem-
bers); Benest, supra note 102, at A7 (explaining how Simi Valley provides a full-
time staff person to offer technical assistance to neighborhood councils); Salsich,
supra note 91, at 719 (noting that part of the reason for neighborhood council suc-
cess in Washington, D.C., stemmed from the funds provided by the District for
their operation).
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smallest of cities. Cities have grown so populous that without
substructures of government to facilitate such civic engage-
ment, direct public participation has become less and less fea-
sible. However, as detailed in Part III, those prior attempts at
public participation through substructures of local government
have failed or had only minimal, limited results.
Neighborhood councils have the potential to fill this void
and infuse civic republicanism into local governments by creat-
ing the opportunity for meaningful civic participation.
Neighborhood councils engage stakeholders with one another
so that they might deliberate over pending local government
decisions and matters facing their communities. They bring
together a broad cross-section of the community, spanning a
more diverse group of stakeholders than currently constitutes
the local political landscape. Community stakeholders will
ideally approach the process with openness to others' points-of-
view instead of pushing their own pre-formulated self-interest.
However, it is possible that when community stakeholders con-
verge, they may initially disagree virulently. The key to the
dialogic process is that the engaged stakeholders, through ar-
guing, discussion, persuasion, and the like, ultimately reach
agreement on what is best for all those involved.
Those who engage in neighborhood councils will likely
"form or transform [participants'] preferences and opinions in
light of that undertaking," especially when exposed to diverse
and oftentimes opposing views.158 Through this transforma-
tive dialogue, participants will gather and process information
provided by others in discerning the best policy or course of ac-
tion, even if it winds up contrary to their initial preferences.
By interfacing with a broad cross-section of their community,
neighborhood council participants will begin to see that local
government decisions have impacts on others in their commu-
nity and will lead to a better sense of community interconnect-
edness. In fact, the self-interested participants may even find
themselves transformed by the deliberative process and thus
become more altruistic after their interactions with other
stakeholders. But even those stakeholders who approach the
deliberative process with only their self-interest in mind will be
forced to act reasonably and strategically in order to garner
158. Fung & Wright, supra note 12, at 20.
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support from others involved in the process and thus further
their ultimate goals.
By providing this opportunity for involvement to the
broader community, neighborhood councils also engage those
normally disenfranchised from the local government decision-
making process. As the influence of these entities stems from
the broad consensus of the community, neighborhood councils
mitigate against the importance of money and power in the
group setting and allow for cross-class collaboration. The de-
liberative process is based, in theory, on reason, persuasion,
and openness, instead of the traditional political advantages of
power, money, and connections. In this regard, neighborhood
councils and the dialogic process more evenly level the political
playing field for those who have been traditionally disenfran-
chised, as well as for average citizens vis-A-vis the interest
groups that currently dominate local government.
When local governments incorporate citizen participation
in policy- and decision-making through neighborhood councils,
they take seriously the right of citizens to have a meaningful
role in shaping policies that will have an impact on their lives
and communities-a key tenet of civic republicanism.
Neighborhood councils also promote discussion among elected
officials, local government administrators and bureaucrats, and
the community with regard to local policies and decisions. By
embedding neighborhood councils as formal entities within cit-
ies and as a necessary, albeit advisory, part of the decision-
making process, local governments provide incentives for com-
munity stakeholders to see decisions effectuated because of
their role in the process, instead of having them handed down
by a distant local government.159 As part of an enduring gov-
ernmental entity, neighborhood council members can monitor
the implementation of local government actions in which they
participated. This ability should increase local government ac-
countability. Moreover, such neighborhood council monitoring
should also increase local government transparency, minimiz-
ing the threat of capture by interest groups which feed off of
the current lack of transparency in city government.
In addition, the dialogic process of neighborhood councils
and their formal role in the decision-making process should
generate superior local government policies, laws, and deci-
159. Fung & Wright, supra note 12, at 26.
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sions than the less reflective alternatives of the managerial
form of local government, 160 the insulated decision-making
process currently in place, and aggregate voting. 161 By involv-
ing citizens in the crafting of policies and programs, local gov-
ernments better suit the needs and priorities of their citi-
zens. 162  Community stakeholders understand the needs,
opportunities, priorities, and special dynamics at work in their
neighborhoods in ways that professional non-residents at-
tempting to craft and implement policies may not. Neighbor-
hood councils thus allow for those most directly affected by lo-
cal government decisions and policies to influence the process
by sharing their knowledge and experience with each other
and, ultimately, the decision-makers. While the public has
other avenues for expressing its views-writing letters to
elected officials, speaking at an open meeting of a city's deci-
sion-making body, attending a community event, etc.-many
individuals do not feel as though their views are taken into
consideration in any meaningful manner. In contrast, the
meaningful and qualitative community input from neighbor-
hood councils results in more connected, directed, responsive,
and representative governmental outputs. Such outputs in-
clude more targeted public expenditures, more informed deci-
sion-making, enhanced delivery of goods and services, and laws
and policies that more closely address the interests of the
community.
To this end, the success of neighborhood councils will likely
be judged by their impact on local government decision-
160. The council-manager form of local government has an elected city council
that vests-by appointment-administrative power, responsibility, and discretion
in a professional city manager. See Schragger, supra note 117, at 2548.
161. Such involvement becomes more necessary with the sense that central-
ized, categorical efforts have failed to promote positive change. Indeed, the infu-
sion of civic republican-inspired neighborhood councils into our local governments
are necessary "because of the failures of both representative democracy and gov-
ernmentally mandated citizen participation" and because categorical approaches
to problem-solving have ignored interrelations among needs and circumstances of
individuals. See Chaskin & Garg, supra note 18, at 633.
162. See id. at 632. By taking an active role, local communities no longer ac-
cept the reductionist label of client, customer, or interest group. See William R.
Potapchuk, Building Sustainable Community Politics: Synergizing Participatory,
Institutional, and Representative Democracy, NAT'L CMC REV., Fall 1996, at 54,
55. Instead, residents reprise their role as key deliberators on public affairs is-
sues. In conjunction with the local government and the private sector, neighbor-
hood groups work effectively to improve the quality of life for all members of the
community. See Hansell, supra note 16, at 9.
2008]
HeinOnline  -- 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 179 2008
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
making. In New York, elected officials and other local govern-
ment decision-makers followed the advice of their neighborhood
councils approximately eighty percent of the time. 163
Neighborhood councils are similarly influential in other cities
as well.164 Yet in a signal that such entities will not solely be
powerful NIMBY forces, city officials approved a large shopping
mall in Portland and a racetrack in Birmingham in the face of
neighborhood opposition because of perceived greater regional
interest that overrode the community's resistance. 165
Neighborhood council success in influencing local govern-
ment decision-making may stem, in part, from an openness on
the part of elected officials, administrators, and bureaucrats to
involve them in this process. 166 If neighborhood councils are
taken seriously by local officials and incorporated into the deci-
sion-making process, such public participation should beget
improved trust and confidence in local government by commu-
nity members. In fact, the authors of Rebirth of Urban Democ-
racy note that in the five cities they studied, the public had
great confidence in neighborhood councils and that city officials
had great respect for these entities as well. 167 In this regard,
by providing proper avenues for citizen participation, local gov-
ernments can function better and increase the satisfaction level
of their citizens. Moreover, if neighborhood councils are a
meaningful part of the local government decision-making proc-
ess, then communities will be more likely to accept the out-
163. Patrick McGreevy, Appointed Charter Panel Weighs Reforms, L.A. DAILY
NEWS, Feb. 12, 1998, at N6; see also Rohrlich, supra note 139 (noting neighbor-
hood council successes in New York City, Portland, and Birmingham).
164. BERRY ET AL., supra note 20, at 150-67 (discussing the successes of the
neighborhood councils they studied); City of Los Angeles Department of
Neighborhood Empowerment, Neighborhood Councils' Accomplishments, avail-
able at http://www.lacity.org/done/accomplishments/donenewsflash_c94014787
10222003.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2007) (detailing many individual and collec-
tive successes of neighborhood councils in Los Angeles).
165. Rohrlich, supra note 139.
166. BERRY ET AL., supra note 20, at 57-60, 65-67 (noting that local govern-
ment officials in Portland, St. Paul, and other cities actively sought feedback from
neighborhood councils on various pending matters).
167. See id. at 18 (stating that "[t]he neighborhood-based participation systems
in the five core cities of our study fulfill a model of democracy substantially differ-
ent from the representative democracy that exists in most American cities"); see
also MUSSO ET AL., supra note 127, at 7 (noting that City of Los Angeles employ-
ees and community members viewed the neighborhood councils and their work
favorably).
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comes of the process, even when an outcome is contrary to the
input they provided. 168
While their success may lead to more legitimacy in the
community, neighborhood councils may also increase social
capital in communities, something that has dwindled in recent
years. 169 Through the dialogic process, neighborhood councils
should bolster a sense of community among stakeholders as
well as clearer group identification. By bringing diverse stake-
holders together to interact and discuss their respective needs
and interests, neighborhood councils can promote tolerance be-
tween these different groups and break down walls of exclusion
that homogeneous communities create. 170
Individuals participating in neighborhood councils will
likely also gain a sense of pride from helping better their com-
munity and taking responsibility for improving the quality of
life for themselves and their neighbors. As stakeholders en-
gage in the local government decision-making process, they will
learn more about the needs of different segments of their com-
munity, as well as the interests of the community as a whole.
This community education process can help inform stake-
holders of the political and governmental issues, thus minimiz-
ing the necessity and desirability of relying on mass propa-
ganda for the bases of political and governmental viewpoints
and decisions. Therefore, civic engagement through neighbor-
hood councils can lead to a more politically educated and adept
electorate and, perhaps, better voter turnout at the local level
immediately and at the state and federal levels in the fu-
ture. 171 For with a better understanding of not only the gov-
168. J. Vincent Buck, The Impact of Citizen Participation Programs and Policy
Decisions on Participants' Opinions, 37 W. POL. Q. 468, 468 (1984).
169. See generally PUTNAM, supra note 4, at 19 ('Where physical capital refers
to physical objects and human capital refers to the properties of individuals, social
capital refers to connections among individuals-social networks and the norms of
reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them.").
170. See Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 35-36 (1998). On
the other hand, as discussed further below, neighborhood councils could lead to
balkanization and NIMBYism where participants focus only on their community
and not the city as a whole.
171. While the current focus of neighborhood councils should be within the lo-
cal government in which they are formed, the long-term possibilities for regional
and inter-governmental influence are promising. See David J. Barron, The Com-
munity Economic Development Movement: A Metropolitan Perspective, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 701, 703 (2003) (explaining that "neighborhood solutions ultimately must be
integrated into a reform program that attends to the metropolitan-wide relation-
ship between distressed communities, the more prosperous jurisdictions that sur-
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ernment and political system but also the needs and wants of
other community members, through this involvement ordinary
citizens may begin to see their ability to effect change through
their participation and their voting.
C. Potential Pitfalls for Neighborhood Councils
Neighborhood councils do not come without risks of signifi-
cant unintended consequences and potential pitfalls. Some
may claim that neighborhood councils are just another mis-
guided utopian solution to a problem that cannot or need not be
solved. Indeed, public choice theorists may posit that
neighborhood councils and the dialogic process will never
change what they see as human nature: rational actors will al-
ways pursue their self-interest, even when interacting with
other community stakeholders. Critics will claim that this vi-
sion for the deliberative process is naively optimistic and will
inevitably lead to more private deal-making. But even if this is
the case, when viewed from a public choice theory perspective,
this result is not untenable.
As mentioned before, the current local political and gov-
ernmental opportunities for average citizens and those disen-
franchised in society are limited, if not non-existent--either by
design or because the barriers to entry and costs of collective
action are prohibitive. By creating a forum for engagement,
those who are not currently as invested in the local government
decision-making process can not only have their voices heard,
but also help influence results by being placed at a relatively
equal status with those who currently wield more power. For
example, in the neighborhood council forum, a developer will
have to interact with, and perhaps make deals with, members
of the community that he or she currently need not face until
public hearings on land use decision-making. By the time such
hearings happen, there is very little likelihood of derailing such
a development project. Neighborhood councils thus encourage
more stakeholders to come to the table with their respective
views. From a public choice theory perspective, these groups
will negotiate and compromise to find a solution that advances
their respective self-interests and is palatable to all. At the
round them, and the regional growth, transportation patterns, and labor patterns
that span them").
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same time, this more inclusive set of stakeholders informing
the decision-making process should correspondingly lead to
more representative policies mirroring the community's wants
and needs.
This model for neighborhood councils presumes that com-
munity stakeholders will have the time and fortitude to sustain
potentially intensive involvement in the deliberative process.
This issue may well determine the success or failure of
neighborhood councils. One of the strongest criticisms of civic
republicanism is the idealized notion that all community
stakeholders will have the time and means to be able to engage
in a deliberative democracy. 172 In our increasingly complex
and demanding society, it may well be too much to ask of many
community members-especially the poor-to give up time that
could otherwise be spent working, spending time with family,
or pursuing other interests. 173  On the other hand, stake-
holders may find that participating in neighborhood councils
gives them a sense of empowerment to counter the alienation
and anomie they may feel with regard to their community and
local government. Moreover, if community members see that
their involvement in neighborhood councils leads to more rep-
resentative decision-making, such results may motivate aver-
age citizens to find time in their busy lives for such public par-
ticipation.
While it is no doubt true that not every community mem-
ber will join or engage in their neighborhood council, one hun-
dred percent participation is not the goal for increased civic en-
gagement. Nor is it even practical, especially when considering
that neighborhood councils will almost certainly face a free
rider problem.174 Instead, neighborhood councils need to build
a critical mass of community stakeholders to engage in this en-
172. W. Bradley Wendel, Nonlegal Regulation of the Legal Profession: Social
Norms in Professional Communities, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1955, 2035 (2001).
173. Some may point to evidence that residents in common interest communi-
ties tend not to participate in associational meetings or affairs as evidence of citi-
zens lack of time and/or interest in participating in a deliberative process. Gil-
lette, supra note 119, at 1403. However, lack of participation in common interest
communities may easily be explained as residents choosing to join a conformed,
homogeneous community so that they would not have to engage in neighborhood
decision-making. Id.
174. As Robert Dahl points out, if a town held a ten-hour meeting and every
participant was afforded ten minutes to speak, only 60 people could participate.
ROBERT DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION?: AUTHORITY IN A GOOD SOCIETY 52
(1990).
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deavor of shared decision-making in order for the benefits of
increased public participation to accrue. The authors of The
Rebirth of Urban Democracy note that neighborhood councils
can be successful with only about ten percent of their represen-
tative population participating regularly. 175 As Frank Michel-
man posits, for meaningful civic engagement, the opportunity
for political dialogue need only be open to all, not necessarily
exercised by all. 176
Neighborhood councils may also suffer from the cart-
before-the-horse syndrome. The logic goes that if neighborhood
councils are given legitimacy and influence in our local gov-
ernment system, then community stakeholders-especially
those that currently refuse to engage in the decision-making
process-will join and engage in neighborhood councils. But
neighborhood councils can only gain such legitimacy and influ-
ence if they serve as representative voices for their respective
communities. This proxy can only occur if a broad cross-section
of the community participates in the dialogic process. Accord-
ingly, elected officials, city administrators, and community
leaders will need to conduct significant and meaningful out-
reach efforts to educate the community as to what the city's
neighborhood council system envisions and entails and to en-
tice those currently disengaged community stakeholders to join
and participate early on in the development of neighborhood
councils. The small size of neighborhood councils as envisioned
in this Article should help provide incentives for such stake-
holders to join. As Richard Briffault notes, smaller governmen-
tal units reward participation by increasing the likelihood that
an individual's input will help influence a decision or policy. 177
By rewarding participation in this manner, neighborhood coun-
cils can provide tangible incentives for non-engaged stake-
holders to participate-both initially and continually.
This notion of outreach by governmental and community
leaders also presupposes a willingness on the part of these en-
trenched political players to share the power that they wield
over the decision-making process. In this regard, neighborhood
councils may meet fierce opposition from those who tradition-
175. BERRY ETAL., supra note 20, at 95-98. Despite this turnout, half to three-
quarters of residents in these cities knew of their neighborhood councils and
thought that their efforts helped shift the balance of power in the city. Id.
176. Michelman, supra note 61, at 1503-04.
177. Briffault, Local Government, supra note 20, at 1124.
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ally hold much of the power in local governance: city bureauc-
racies, lobbyists, business interests (particularly developers),
and other special interest groups. As mentioned above, unless
elected officials and city administrators embrace this new form
of substructure of local government, neighborhood councils'
chances of success will be considerably diminished.
Even if local government officials are welcoming of such
civic engagement, a neighborhood council may be susceptible to
capture by private interests, resulting in its serving less as a
conduit for discerning the needs of the community and more as
yet another governmental entity that advances an individual
interest over the collective interest. In particular, those with
more wealth or power may attempt to use these advantages to
dominate and control neighborhood councils. To diminish the
effectiveness of these rent-seekers, neighborhood councils must
involve a broad cross-section of community stakeholders and
must place all stakeholders on equal footing within the delib-
erative process. Moreover, by ensuring that neighborhood
councils are transparent and accountable-through a city de-
partment working with these entities-such rent-seeking can
be minimized, if not eliminated. Neighborhood councils can
also avoid this capture concern by ensuring that they are ac-
countable to the communities they serve. High visibility and
an openness to a broad range of stakeholders in the community
will help accomplish the transparency and accountability nec-
essary to mitigate against interest group capture.
If they cannot capture neighborhood councils, interest
groups or other self-interested parties may forum shop by seek-
ing to influence the political process in other ways-for exam-
ple, by going directly to elected officials or local government
administrators. However, after they have participated in the
process, one of the functions of neighborhood councils is to
monitor local government decision-making and policy imple-
mentation. Such involvement should help to limit the ability of
interest groups to capture the government process if they failed
in doing so at the neighborhood council level. For this monitor-
ing effect to occur, elected officials and other government deci-
sion-makers must accord neighborhood councils the influence
and respect in the local government structure that this Article
envisions. If they do so, interest groups may learn the impor-
2008]
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tance of engaging in the deliberative process to gain support for
their projects, interests, or other matters. 178
While one of the goals of neighborhood councils is to bring
stakeholders together to deliberate over matters facing their
communities, the empowerment of communities in this manner
may exacerbate the balkanization of localities where communi-
ties focus only on their own individual needs and not the city as
a whole. Moreover, there is also the Madisonian concern that
smaller, local governments are more subject to factions and the
tyranny of the majority. 179 As James Lowe notes, "[c]ompletely
eliminating supervision of decentralized units by central gov-
ernments and the courts would open the door both to discrimi-
nation and tyranny within the unit and to inequality and dis-
crimination between units."' 180 In this regard, structuring
neighborhood councils as part of the local government system
also has merit from a checks and balances standpoint that
helps minimize these concerns. For example, a city could check
a racially discriminatory neighborhood council by withholding
its funding until it complies with the broad policy objectives for
neighborhood councils. The city could even decertify such a
neighborhood council if its nonconformance persists. Having
an administrative staff within the city to help facilitate and
oversee neighborhood councils also helps mitigate against such
problems, as the staff can report and address neighborhood
councils that act illegally or inconsistently with the city's pa-
rameters for neighborhood councils. Moreover, if neighborhood
councils are a formal part of city government, the city can work
to coordinate horizontal integration between neighborhood
councils by bringing them together periodically to talk with one
another and learn about what each other is doing, as well as
what impacts one council's actions might have on others. This
178. Some note how developers have realized the importance of obtaining sup-
port from the community when applying for entitlements and other land use ap-
provals. See, e.g., Gabriel A. Espinosa, Building on Brownfields: A Catalyst for
Neighborhood Revitalization, 11 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 24 (2000).
179. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 49 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); see also Rose, supra note 98, at 855 (a "body drawn from too small or too
homogeneous a constituency may be dominated by a single interest or faction").
But see Ellickson, supra note 31, at 89 (arguing that the larger the size of gov-
ernment, the more difficult it is for citizens to monitor its decisions and policies,
thus making larger governments more prone to capture by interest groups).
180. Lowe, supra note 88, at 183.
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type of collaboration should also mitigate against balkaniza-
tion.
Some of these concerns have already materialized in cities
like Los Angeles. Accusations of electioneering, lack of com-
munity outreach, and excessive Board of Director influence
have marked the early years of neighborhood councils in Los
Angeles. 181 Other problems with Los Angeles' neighborhood
council system include a lack of funding for the entities, a lack
of diversity in terms of stakeholders, and the need for better
communication between neighborhood councils.182 And while
neighborhood councils in Los Angeles seem to be connecting
community members with one another and their local govern-
ment, average neighborhood council meetings draw fewer than
fifty people. 183  Nevertheless, despite these challenges, the
neighborhood council structure-as evidenced by some of its
successes thus far-has the potential for a long-term impact on
local government.
CONCLUSION
It is important to remember that "[s]ince the earliest days
of the Republic, the maintenance of political participation by its
citizens has been viewed as essential to the preservation of free
government."'184 Yet our government suffers from a lack of
civic engagement. Neighborhood councils provide a new oppor-
tunity to reinvigorate community involvement in local govern-
ment decision-making and shift from a winner-take-all process
to a dialogic one that embodies civic republican values. As de-
tailed above, there is evidence of some short-term successes in
that regard. The question, of course, is whether such a trans-
formation in local government can be duplicated in more cities
and then sustained in the long term.
Neighborhood councils have the potential to effect such a
transformation in ways that we have not seen since the early
days of our nation. Even if they fail to live up to the lofty goals
of civic republicanism, neighborhood councils still serve a valu-
181. See MUSSO ETAL., supra note 127, at 3.
182. See generally JULIET MUSSO ET AL., REPRESENTING DIVERSITY IN
CoMMuNiTY GOVERNANCE: NEIGHBORHOOD COUNCILS IN LOS ANGELES, Urban
Policy Brief, University of Southern California Urban Initiative 1 (2004).
183. MUSSO ET AL., supra note 127, at 5.
184. Liebmann, supra note 24, at 336.
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able purpose in changing-even if to a lesser degree-local gov-
ernment culture. By involving in the decision-making process
people who are otherwise shut out of the current local govern-
ment system, neighborhood councils bring more stakeholders
and their views, wants, and interests to the bargaining table
that public choice theory describes. Even if the community
does not think and act in the common good as civic republican-
ism would envision, the infusion of broader viewpoints and in-
terests still would lead to more representative decision-making
as new political players and the currently entrenched ones ne-
gotiate in the political marketplace of public choice theory. In
this regard, neighborhood councils have the potential to make a
marked difference on local government through increased civic
engagement that is-if not transformative-more democratic.
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